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SHOW ME THE MONEY: THE  
DOMINANCE OF WEALTH IN DETERMINING 
RIGHTS PERFORMANCE IN ASIA 
RANDALL PEERENBOOM* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In recent decades, Asia has emerged as one of the most contested sites 
for the increasingly powerful international human rights movement.  Most 
notably, the heavily politicized Asian-values debate called into question the 
universal pretensions of the international human rights regime.1  More 
fundamentally, the experiences of Asian states over the last five decades 
challenged two widely held if somewhat inconsistent views: first, that 
democracy was the key to economic growth, or, reversing the causal 
direction, that economic growth would inevitably lead to political reforms, 
democratization and better protection of human rights.  Many Asian states 
experienced their periods of rapid growth under authoritarian governments, 
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 1. For an overview of the debates, see Randall Peerenboom, Beyond Universalism and 
Relativism: The Evolving Debates over "Values in Asia," 14 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2003) 
[hereinafter  Beyond Universalism and Relativism].  See also MICHAEL D. BARR, CULTURAL POLITICS 
AND ASIAN VALUES: THE TEPID WAR 1 (2002) (providing an excellent overview from a political, 
historical and religious perspective, while arguing that the debates over Asian values are far from over 
as Asian countries attempt to negotiate their own form of modernity); THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE 
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Joanne R. Bauer & Daniel A. Bell eds., 1999) (discussing perspectives on the 
"Asian values" debates and exploring possible solutions to the human rights challenges in East Asia); 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND ASIAN VALUES: CONTESTING NATIONAL IDENTITIES AND CULTURAL 
REPRESENTATIONS IN ASIA (Michael Jacobsen & Ole Bruun eds., 2000). 
 Although the term "Asian values" is not often invoked these days, concerns about differences in 
values and other circumstances continue to surface in ongoing discussions about democratization, rule 
of law and human rights in ways that belie the confident assertions that Asian values existed solely in 
the minds of authoritarian government leaders.  Larry Diamond, How People View Democracy: 
Findings from Public Opinion Surveys in Four Regions (Jan. 11, 2001), at http://www.stanford.edu/ 
~ldiamond/papers/howPeopleViewDem.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2004)  (noting that democracy does 
not always work, and that democratic consolidation depends on values for which there are regional 
differences and most importantly on good governance and economic growth); see generally Randall 
Peerenboom, Varieties of Rule of Law, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW: THEORIES AND 
IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN TWELVE ASIAN COUNTRIES, FRANCE AND THE U.S. 1 (Randall 
Peerenboom ed., 2004) [hereinafter ASIAN DISCOURSES]. 
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including South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia and 
still today China. Moreover, while some Asian states have made the 
transition to multiple-party, competitive-election democracy, others have 
not, including China, Hong Kong, Vietnam and Myanmar.  Still others, 
including Singapore, Malaysia and Cambodia, exist in a limbo state 
variously described as soft authoritarianism, semi-dictatorship, semi-
democracy or nonliberal electoral democracy.  Even those states that have 
most fully embraced democracy, including South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, 
Thailand and more recently Indonesia continue to interpret and implement 
human rights in ways that differ in important respects from some Western 
liberal democracies, thus calling into question the extent to which they 
should be described as liberal democracies. 
In addition, the international human rights community has focused on 
several Asian countries because of their poor records, especially in the area 
of civil and political rights, and in China’s case, also because of its size and 
geopolitical importance.2  Post 9-11, Asian states, several with large 
Islamic populations, have come under scrutiny as the U.S.-led war on 
terrorism has renewed concern that some states would reinstate or make 
greater use of broad national security laws to undermine the civil liberties 
of not only suspected terrorists, but political dissidents and even ordinary 
citizens. 
Past discussions about human rights and values in Asia have been 
hampered by the lack of reference to empirical studies to back up the strong 
theoretical, and in some cases polemical, claims being made on both sides 
about the differences or lack thereof in fundamental values.  Numerous 
multiple-country quantitative studies have demonstrated significant 
regional effects with respect to democratization,3 labor rights,4 women’s 
rights,5 personal integrity rights,6 freedom from government intrusions, rule 
                                                                                                                                      
 2. For the argument that China is subject to a double standard, see Randall Peerenboom, 
Assessing Human Rights in China: Why the Double Standard?, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 101 (2005). 
 3. Steven Levitsky & Lucan Way, Autocracy by Democratic Rules: The Dynamics of 
Competitive Authoritarianism in the Post-Cold War Era, paper presented at the annual meeting of The 
American Political Science Association, Boston, Aug. 28 – Sept. 1, 2002, at http://apsaproceedings.cup. 
org/Site/papers/045/045008WayLucan.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2004). 
 4. Layna Mosley & Saika Uno, Racing to the Bottom or Climbing to the Top?  Foreign Direct 
Investment and Human Rights, paper presented at the annual meeting of The American Political Science 
Association, Boston, Aug. 28 – Sept. 1, 2002, at http://apsaproceedings.cup.org/Site/papers/046/046005 
MosleyLayn.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2004) (finding a strong regional relationship between regions and 
labor rights, and that the Asian and Pacific regions were not as protective of labor rights as Western 
Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, although they were more protective than the Middle East, North 
Africa and Latin America, and on par with Sub-Saharan Africa). 
 5. Clair Apodaca, Measuring Women's Economic and Social Rights Achievement, 20(1) HUM. 
RTS. Q. 139, 163-65 (1998) (finding that regional coefficients play a larger role than GNP in the 
achievement of women's economic and social rights, although the regional identification of Asian and 
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of law and good governance,7 and cultural values8 that in turn affect rights 
performance.9  Although these studies generally define Asia very broadly, 
frequently deal with rights in a very general way, and give rise to numerous 
methodological issues, they are invaluable in locating Asian countries 
within a larger comparative context and in providing an empirical basis to 
sort out some of the claims about Asian values.10  They do not, however, 
generally measure the degree of variance in rights performance within Asia, 
or attempt to explain the variation within Asia or why Asia as a region 
might differ from other regions. 
In Part I, I provide an empirical overview of the performance of 
twelve Asian countries11 with respect to physical integrity rights, civil and 
political rights, social and economic rights and other indicia of quality of 
life including poverty, infant mortality, life expectancy, primary school 
                                                                                                                                      
African explains less variation than the Middle East regional designation; and noting that various 
literatures suggest that the explanation lies in "culturally specific attitudes towards women's status, 
developed under differing historical and economic conditions."). 
 6. Steven C. Poe et al., The Abuse of Personal Integrity in the Eighties: Regional Perspectives, 
paper presented at the Comparative Human Rights and Repression Conference at the University of 
Colorado, Boulder, June 20-21, 1997 (unpublished manuscript, on file with journal); see also David 
Reilly, Diffusing Human Rights, paper presented at the annual meeting of The American Political 
Science Association, Philadelphia, Aug. 28-31, 2003, available at http://www.apsanet.org/mtgs/ (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2004) (noting significant and persisting regional differences in personal integrity 
rights).  All references to APSA papers for 2003 are available at this cite [hereinafter APSA]. 
 7. Amir Licht et al., Culture Rules: The Foundations of Rule of Law and Other Norms of 
Governance (June 9, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
 8. See generally Peter B. Smith et al., Cultural Values, Sources of Guidance, and their Relevance 
to Managerial Behavior - A 47-Nation Study, 33(2) J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 188 (2002) 
(summarizing various multiple country studies that find similarities on various dimensions of values 
within the Asian region, particularly along the dimensions of individualism versus collectivism, 
autonomy versus social embeddedness, and hierarchy versus egalitarianism). 
 9. Frank B. Cross, International Determinants of Human Rights and Welfare: Law, Wealth or 
Culture, 7 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 265, 276-77 (1997) (finding that cultural values are an important 
determinant of rights and that Western nations have a higher level of freedom from government 
intrusion even after controlling for GDP and other factors). 
 10.  For example, the World Bank's good governance study includes, in the East Asian region, 
Brunei, Cambodia, China, East Timor, Fiji, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Kiribati, North and South Korea, 
Laos, Macao, Malaysia, the Marshall Islands, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nauru, Papa New Guinea, the 
Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, the Salomon Islands, Taiwan, Thailand, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and 
Vietnam. It includes, in the South Asian region, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, 
Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.  Fortunately, the interactive database does provide information on 
individual countries and allows one to select up to 20 countries for comparison.  See Daniel Kaufmann 
et al., Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002 (Apr. 5, 2004), available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/govmatters3_wber.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2004). 
 11. The twelve Asian countries include low, middle, and high income states; a wide range of 
political regime types; countries whose rights records vary widely; and countries from East and 
Southeast Asia.  Nevertheless, the group is biased toward (North) East Asia, does not include former 
Soviet republics, and does not include the countries with the worst legal systems or human rights 
records, such as Laos, Cambodia, or Myanmar. 
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enrollment, government expenditures on education, health and military, 
quality of governance measured in terms of regulatory effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption, and law and order 
and social stability as reflected in crime rates and the number of drug users, 
suicides, divorces and young mothers.12  I also include several other 
countries from different parts of the world for comparison points, focusing 
in particular on the United States and France.13 
Notwithstanding shortcomings in the data and other well-known 
limitations of empirical studies,14 the empirical overview demonstrates a 
                                                                                                                                      
 12. I do not address the rights of the criminally accused.  Nor do I focus directly on labor rights, 
rights of women, or environmental rights.  For a discussion of labor issues in Asia, see LAW AND 
LABOUR MARKET REGULATION IN EAST ASIA (Sean Cooney et al. eds., 2002).  For women's rights, see 
UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, UNDP Gender-related Development Index (2003 statistics), 
available at http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/indicator/indic_196_1_1.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2004), 
and UNDP Gender Empowerment Measures (2003 statistics), available at http://www.undp.org/ 
hdr2003/indicator/indic_207_1_1.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).  The UNDP database also includes 
information on ratification of environmental treaties, use of energy, and other environment-related data. 
 13. I focus on the U.S. and France as comparison points to show that there are differences even 
within economically advanced liberal democracies on a range of specific rights issues and to avoid 
over-idealization of rights performance in Western countries.  Although the U.S. and France score 
higher on many rights indicators than many other Western countries, and thus are not representative of 
the region as whole, they are far from perfect in many areas, especially when it comes to economic, 
social, and cultural rights.  Furthermore, to the extent that legal institutions matter to the protection of 
rights, the U.S. (a common law country) and France (a civil law country) differ in significant ways, 
including with respect to constitutional review, and both have been influential as sources of legal 
transplants.  Several of the legal systems in Asia were modeled on the French civil law system.  
Meanwhile, the U.S. has exerted considerable influence on the legal systems of Japan and the 
Philippines, and has attempted to exert influence more broadly across the region, albeit with limited 
success, through an aggressive human rights foreign policy. 
 14. On the advantages and disadvantages of empirical studies, see Todd Landman, Comparative 
Politics and Human Rights, 24(4) HUM. RTS. Q. 890, 896-97 (2002); Russel Lawrence Barsh, 
Measuring Human Rights: Problems of Methodology and Purpose, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 87, 90-98(1993); 
Kenneth Bollen, Political Rights and Political Liberties in Nations: An Evaluation of Human Rights 
Measures, 1950-1984, 8(4) HUM. RTS. Q.567, 569-72 (1986). 
The philosopher Alasdair MacIntrye has argued that differences in cultural narratives and the 
contingent circumstances of countries preclude a science of universal human rights.  ALASDAIR 
MACINTRYE, Is a Science of Comparative Politics Possible?, in AGAINST THE SELF-IMAGES OF THE 
AGE 260-79 (1971).  Other critics argue that human rights attach to individuals, and aggregating 
violations and ranking countries on a scale of better to worse may cause us to lose sight of individuals 
and the fact that any violation is morally significant.  See John McCamant, A Critique of Present 
Measures of Human Rights Development and an Alternative, in GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PUBLIC 
POLICIES, COMPARATIVE MEASURES, AND NGO STRATEGIES 123, 124-32 (Ved P. Nanda et al. eds., 
1981) (suggesting that the use of "societal-level concepts" is preferable to aggregating the violations of 
different human rights). 
Choosing, operationalizing, and measuring the dependent variable (rights) and the independent 
variables (democracy, culture, institutional features such as judicial independence, etc.) have all proven 
challenging.  Attempts to develop a composite measure to rank countries for human rights performance 
have failed because countries generally protect some rights better than others and because of the 
controversial normative judgments inherent in prioritizing rights: how does one compare the arrest of a 
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person advocating democracy with the lack of medical care for AIDS victims or children being sold 
into sexual slavery? 
Accordingly, most studies attempt to measure one or more distinct type of right.  Some types of 
rights, however, are more difficult to measure than others, either because of problems operationalizing 
the right or because of lack of data.  Another concern has been that quantitative studies, reflecting the 
normative biases of the Western-dominated human rights regime, have focused excessively on civil and 
political rights to the detriment of other rights.  The over-emphasis on civil and political rights is 
particularly problematic for present purposes, in that Asian governments often claim that they do better 
when judged by economic and social rights and measures that indicate a high quality of life, such as 
effective governance, political stability, and low crime rates.  This concern is echoed by those who 
argue that "rights talk" is itself impoverished, and that rights must be complemented if not supplanted 
by discourses of duties, needs, wants, and/or capabilities.  For a useful discussion of rights and needs, 
see Jeremy Waldron, Rights and Needs: The Myth of Disjunction, in LEGAL RIGHTS: HISTORICAL AND 
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 87 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1996).  For capabilities, see 
Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities and Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 273 (1997), and Amartya 
Sen, Capability and Wellbeing, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 30 (Martha C. Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 
1993). 
Because rights may be subject to various limitations by law, and are implemented to varying 
degrees in practice, rights must be scored along a continuum.  Different researchers, however, 
operationalize the same right in different ways, relying on a number of different factors to produce a 
composite score.  In producing a composite score, they inevitably rely on debatable assumptions about 
the relationship between the various factors and how they should be weighted and aggregated.  Similar 
problems exist with respect to some of the most common independent variables.  Democracy, for 
example, has been defined and measured in a variety of ways.  See generally Kenneth Bollen, Issues in 
the Comparative Measurement of Political Democracy, 45(2) AM. SOC. REV. 370 (1980) (discussing the 
limitations of several existing indices of democracy, and presenting a revised index incorporating 
political liberties and popular sovereignty indices); Gerardo Munck & Jay Verkuilen, Conceptualizing 
and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices, 35 (1) COMP. POL. STUD. 5 (2002) 
(reviewing existing democracy indices, and concluding that no single index successfully responds to the 
challenges of conceptualization, measurement, and aggregation); Christian Davenport & David 
Armstrong, Democracy and the Violation of Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis of the Third Wave 
(2002), at http://apsaproceedings.cup.org/Site/abstracts/011/011002ArmstrongD.htm (last visited Oct.  
30, 2004) (examining a variety of statistical methods that measure the relationship between democracy 
and state repression). 
In the end, quantitative studies are only as good as the data.  Unfortunately, data on human rights 
compliance is far from ideal.  Many countries do not keep accurate records of human rights violations.  
The coding of data often involves considerable subjective judgment, and in some cases has been 
politically biased, especially in U.S. State Department reports that are less critical of allies than non-
allies.  Given the time-consuming nature of collecting and coding data, researchers have relied heavily 
on a relatively small number of data sources.  For an overview of various data sets and approaches, see 
Michael Haas, Empirical Dimensions of Human Rights, in POLICY STUDIES AND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 43 (Stuart S. Nagel and David Louis Cingranelli eds., 1996). 
Perhaps the biggest drawback to most quantitative studies is that they are of limited use to 
policymakers.  Many studies, because of their generality, do not provide information that policymakers 
can act on. Informing policymakers that war is a threat to personal integrity rights will not help them in 
preventing or ending wars.  Economic factors may be the most important determinant of better human 
rights performance overall, but economists have long been stumped as to how to ensure sustainable 
economic growth.  The inconsistency of results among empirical studies, especially when more specific 
variables are introduced, further reduces their practical utility.  For instance, studies of the effect of FDI 
(foreign direct investment) on human rights performance have been inconclusive: some have found that 
there is no significant relationship, others have found that FDI is weakly or in some cases strongly 
associated with better protection of rights, and some have found that increased FDI has a negative 
impact on rights protection.  In response to criticisms of excessive generality, researchers have 
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wide variation in Asia with respect to rights performance.  At the same 
time, patterns emerge with respect to lower scores for civil and political 
freedoms among East Asian countries and higher scores for social and 
economic rights as well as good governance, law and order, crime control 
and social stability.  These patterns are consistent with aspects of the 
“Asian values” platform that emphasize the importance, if not the priority, 
of social and economic rights relative to civil and political rights.  
Similarly, the studies suggest that even in Asian democracies the liberal 
emphasis on the individual will often take a back seat to collective interests 
and social stability.  However, the wide variation within Asia still requires 
an explanation. 
Accordingly, Part II examines several possible explanations for the 
wide variation among Asian countries.  Clearly the story is complicated.  A 
number of factors come into play, with some factors more important for 
different types of rights or playing a different role in different countries or 
at different times within a country.  War, political regime type, the nature 
and level of development of legal institutions, population size, colonial 
history, religion and cultural factors all play a role.  In several countries, 
ethnic diversity, religious tensions and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism 
or separatist movements have had a major impact on rights policies and 
performances.  However, consistent with the empirical evidence globally, 
by far the most important explanatory factor is wealth, except with respect 
to physical integrity rights, for which domestic conflict is the biggest 
factor.15 
                                                                                                                                      
attempted to test the impact of more specific variables on a wider range of more specific rights.  
However, the proliferation of studies has led to inconsistent and counterintuitive results. 
Policymakers are also likely to be troubled by the normatively unappealing implications of many 
quantitative studies.  What, for example, is a rights-inclined policymaker to do with the studies showing 
Islam to be negatively correlated with democracy and human rights protection? Should the goal be to 
repress Islam, and if so, how? 
On the whole, quantitative studies are useful in demonstrating general patterns, but there are 
always exceptions to the general rules.  How the various factors will play out in a given country at a 
given time often requires a more detailed qualitative study of that particular state. Qualitative studies 
are able to provide a deeper and more nuanced account of economic, political, and legal reforms and 
their relation to human rights protection.  As a result, they may provide a better sense of what the main 
obstacles are to better rights performance in a particular context, and thus offer more useful policy 
guidance. 
This article should be read in conjunction with THE RIGHTS OF ASIANS TODAY: A COMPARATIVE 
LEGAL STUDY OF TWELVE ASIAN COUNTRIES, FRANCE AND THE U.S. (Randall Peerenboom et al. eds., 
forthcoming 2005) [hereinafter THE RIGHTS OF ASIANS TODAY], which provides a more detailed 
empirical account by examining legal cases and social-political events relating to a range of specific 
civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights in the twelve Asian countries chosen here with 
comparisons to the U.S. and France. 
 15. William H. Meyer, Human Rights and MNCs: Theory Versus Quantitative Analysis, 18 (2) 
HUM. RTS. Q. 368, 393-94 (1996) (GNP biggest contributor to civil, political, social, and economic 
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The implications are twofold.  First, comparing a lower-middle 
income country such as China to the U.S. makes about as much sense as 
comparing a piano to a duck.  Countries should be compared to other 
countries at a similar income level to determine how well they are doing 
given the available resources.  Second, there is considerable merit to the 
Bangkok Declaration emphasis on the right to development and the Asian-
values emphasis on economic growth.  Although money is not everything, 
it is essential.  In the subtle and complex interplay of economics, politics, 
culture, law and institutions in determining rights performance, what 
matters most is wealth.  Put bluntly if somewhat too simply, if you want 
better performance across a range of rights and indicators of human 
wellbeing, show me the money. 
II.  A PROFILE OF TWELVE ASIAN COUNTRIES,  
FRANCE AND U.S. ACROSS DIFFERENT TYPES OF RIGHTS 
The tables in this Article provide a snapshot summary of performance 
on a variety of rights and other indicators of wellbeing for the region as a 
whole as well as the countries in this study and other selected countries 
from around the world as comparison points.  The studies define variables 
in different ways, use different data sets, rely on data from different years, 
are subject to wide margins of error, and so on.  Thus, the tables are no 
substitute for more in-depth studies.  Nevertheless, they are useful in 
providing a general sense of the range of difference within Asia on rights 
issues, and also in showing how Asian states compare to other states in 
other parts of the world at similar stages of economic, political and legal 
development. 
A. Physical or Personal Integrity Rights 
Physical or personal integrity rights refer to the number of political 
prisoners, extra-judicial killings, incidences of torture and arbitrary 
detentions.  They are among the most basic of rights.  They tend to be 
subject to wide variation by year in a particular country because wars and 
                                                                                                                                      
rights).  See also GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE'S CONSEQUENCES: COMPARING VALUES, BEHAVIORS, 
INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS ACROSS NATIONS 248, 251-53 (2d ed. 2001) (wealth was the main 
factor affecting rights compliance, although individualism mattered in rich countries); Steven C. Poe et 
al., Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study 
Covering the Years 1976-1993, 43 INT'L STUD. Q. 291, 310 (1999) (discussing the significant impact of 
civil war on personal integrity abuses); Apodaca, supra note 5, at 160 (higher GDP associated with 
better performance on women's rights); Steven Poe et al., supra note 6 (discussing the impact of 
domestic and international conflicts on the regional development of personal integrity rights); Neil J. 
Mitchell & James M. McCormick, Economic and Political Explanations of Human Rights Violations, 
40 WORLD POL. 476, 497 (1988) (higher levels of economic wellbeing associated with better physical 
integrity rights records). 
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political crises may arise or end suddenly.  For instance, despite thousands 
of complaints of torture and police brutality every year, the U.S. had one of 
the best records in 1996, enjoying a level-1 ranking, indicating a country 
under a secure rule of law, where people are not imprisoned for their 
political views, and torture or political murders are rare or exceptional.16  
However, it has since been demoted to level 2 because of the detentions of 
suspected terrorists in Guatanamo Bay, Iraq and Afghanistan and the secret 
arrests of thousands, including many Muslims, in the U.S.,17 which 
constitute arbitrary detention under the ICCPR.18  Level 2 indicates a 
limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity.  However, 
few persons are affected, and torture and beatings are exceptional.  Political 
murder is rare.  Whether the U.S. will drop further as a result of the reports 
of widespread torture of Iraqis and others captured in the war on terror 
remains to be seen. 
Notwithstanding ups and downs within countries, there has been no 
improvement globally in personal integrity violations in recent decades.19 
                                                                                                                                      
 16. See AMNESTY INT'L, United States of America: Rights for All, 17, 19, 26, 43 (1998), available 
at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR510351998?open&of=ENG-USA (last visited Oct. 
30, 2004) ("There is a widespread and persistent police brutality across the USA.  Thousands of 
individual complaints about police abuse are reported each year . . . .  Police officers have beaten and 
shot unresisting suspects; they have misused batons, chemical sprays and electro-shock weapons; they 
have injured or killed people by placing them in dangerous restraint holds . . . .  Common forms of ill-
treatment are repeated kicks, punches or blows with batons or other weapons, sometimes after a suspect 
has already been restrained or rendered helpless.  There are also complaints involving various types of 
restraint hold, pepper (OC) spray, electro-shock weapons and firearms . . . .  [V]ictims include not only 
criminal suspects but also bystanders and people who questioned police actions or were involved in 
minor disputes or confrontations."). 
 17. Thomas Blanton, National Security and Open Government in the United States: Beyond the 
Balancing Test, in NATIONAL SECURITY AND OPEN GOVERNMENT: STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE 33, 
59 (Campbell Public Affairs Institute, ed., 2003), available at http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/campbell/ 
opengov/Chapter%202.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).  See also DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: 
DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 25-26 (2003) 
(noting that of the estimated 5000 people arrested by May 2003, not one had been charged with 
involvement in the attacks on Sept. 11 and only a handful have been charged with terrorist-related 
crimes). 
 18. Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 
1, 10-15 '(2001); Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: The Ad Hoc DOD Rules of 
Procedure, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 677, 678-79' (2002). 
 19. James A. McCann & Mark Gibney, An Overview of Political Terror in the Developing World, 
1980-1991, in POLICY STUDIES AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 15, 23-24 (Stuart S. Nagel & David 
Louis Cingranelli eds., 1996) (noting that political terror increased in the developing world in the 1980s 
and finding that democracy does not by itself ensure low levels of terror); see also Reilly, supra note 6, 
at 16 (over the period from 1976-1996, the number of countries with the best score actually decreased, 
countries with the worst score increased, while the mean remained about the same); Todd Landman, 
Norms and Rights: A Non-Recursive Model of Human Rights Protection, paper presented at the annual 
meeting of The American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, Aug. 28-31, 2003, at APSA, 
supra note 6 (noting an increase in violations of personal integrity and torture between 1985 and 1993). 
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As expected, in the Asian region, there are more violations of personal 
integrity rights where there is political instability, rebel insurgencies and 
terrorism, as Figure 1.1 shows.20  At level 4, India remains a major trouble 
spot, due largely to ethnic and religious tensions.21  China scores poorly 
because of the high incidence of torture, arbitrary detentions and the arrests 
of democracy advocates, labor unionists and others who oppose 
government policies.22  Indonesia, even after democratization, continues to 
experience widespread personal integrity violations, consistent with the 
efforts to restore order in Aceh, Papua and Maluku provinces and to 
prevent terrorism in the country.23  South Korea performed surprisingly 
poorly in the mid-1990s, due apparently to violent protests by students and 
labor organizations.  At level 3, it is on par with Malaysia, which was 
ranked higher in 1996 but which has suffered in recent years under the 
threat of terrorism and rising Islamic fundamentalism. 
Vietnam scores higher than might be expected.  Vietnam and Thailand 
both received a level-2 rating based on Amnesty International reports and a 
level-3 rating based on U.S. State Department reports.  Thailand, however, 
has recently experienced violent clashes between the government and 
Islamic groups in some Muslim-dominated southern provinces, leading to 
the imposition of martial law in the region.24  Singapore merits a level-2 
rating, reflecting the use of defamation laws to rein in high profile 
opposition figures and the reliance on tough national security laws and 
other nonliberal laws to crack down on terrorists, people inciting ethnic 
conflict, drug traffickers and other criminals.  Only Taiwan receives the 
highest level-1 score. 
                                                                                                                                      
 20. Linda C. Keith & Steven C. Poe, Personal Integrity Abuse during Domestic Crises, paper 
presented at annual meeting of The American Political Science Association, Boston, Aug. 29-Sept. 1, 
2002, at http://apsaproceedings.cup.org/Site/papers/046/046004PoeSteven0.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 
2004) (also noting previous studies finding that civil war and then violent rebellion lead to more 
violations of personal integrity rights). 
 21. Level 3 indicates extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment.  
Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common.  Unlimited detention, with or 
without a trial, for political views is accepted.  At level 4 the practices of level 3 are expanded to larger 
numbers.  Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life.  In spite of its generality, on 
this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.  At level 5, the terrors of level 
4 are expanded to the whole population.  The leaders place no limits on the means or thoroughness with 
which they pursue personal or ideological goals.  Mark Gibney, Notes on Levels of Political Terror 
Scale, available at http://www.unca.edu/politicalscience/faculty-staff/gibney_docs/Notes%20on%20 
Levels%20of%20Political%20Terror%20Scale.doc (last visited Oct. 30, 2004). 
 22. For a more thorough discussion of China's rating and the argument that a level-4 rating 
overstates the problems, see Peerenboom, supra note 2. 
 23. Hikmahanto Juwana, Human Rights in Indonesia, in THE RIGHTS OF ASIANS TODAY, supra 
note 14. 
 24. Vitit Muntarbhorn, Human Rights in the Era of "Thailand Incorporated (Inc.)," in THE 
RIGHTS OF ASIANS TODAY, supra note 14. 
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B. Civil and Political Rights 
The World Bank’s Voice and Accountability scale incorporates a 
number of indicators measuring various aspects of the political process, 
civil liberties and political rights, including the right to participate in the 
selection of government representatives and the independence of the 
media.25  The East Asia region falls squarely in the middle among all 
regions as shown in Table 5.1.  However, there is a considerable range 
within the Asian region as indicated in Figure 2.1.  Japan and Taiwan score 
reasonably well, though not as high as the U.S. and France, whereas 
Vietnam and China are in the lowest 10%. 
As suggested by Figure 4.1 and confirmed by other studies discussed 
below, civil and political rights are closely related to wealth. Nevertheless, 
East Asian countries with a Confucian influence, even if democratic, tend 
to do poorly relative to income level.26  Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, 
Malaysia, Hong Kong, China and Vietnam all underperform relative to 
income.27  In contrast, South Korea, India, the Philippines, Thailand and 
recently Indonesia outperform the average in their income class.28 
C. Social and Economic Rights: Poverty Measures 
China and other Asian governments have attacked the bias of the 
international rights community in emphasizing civil and political rights 
over the right to subsistence, economic rights and the right to development.  
How well do Asian states do on these other dimensions? 
Figure 3.1 presents the UNDP rankings for social and economic rights 
in 2002 as measured by the Human Development Index.  The HDI 
measures the average achievement in a country in three basic dimensions: a 
long and healthy life based on life expectancy at birth; education and 
knowledge measured by adult literacy and combined primary, secondary 
and tertiary enrollments; and a decent standard of living as measured by 
GDP per capita ($PPP).  As one would expect, wealthier countries 
                                                                                                                                      
 25. The following data is obtained from Kaufmann et al., supra note 10, available at 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2002/index.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2004). 
 26. A chart comparing a country's performance to the average performance in its income class can 
be readily generated using the World Bank interactive data set by simply selecting the country and the 
good governance indicators, or selecting several countries for a particular indicator, and then selecting 
"income category average."  As the chart is easy to generate but messy and hard to read without the 
color-coding provided on the World Bank website, I have not reproduced the chart here.  The chart is 
available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2002/index.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2004). 
 27. Other Asian countries that underperform relative to income are Myanmar, Laos and North 
Korea.  Id. 
 28. Other Asian countries that outperform the average are Mongolia, Cambodia and East Timor.  
Id. 
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everywhere, including in Asia, generally have better HDI scores, with 
wealth constituting a more important factor than the nature of political 
regime. 
However, the general composite measure fails to tell the whole story.  
Higher levels of economic development and riches for some are consistent 
with an impoverished life for many others.  Asia as a region has been 
relatively successful over the last decade in reducing poverty, defined as 
the admittedly minimalist standard of living on less than $1/day.  In 
contrast, poverty in other regions has increased or remained more or less 
the same.29 
The performance of the East Asian region is somewhat deceptive in 
that the results are skewed by the remarkable performance of China, which 
lifted 150 million, 12% of the population, out of poverty in just nine years.  
To be sure, even within China, poverty remains an issue in some regions, 
with some 16% still living on less than $1/day.  Moreover, the income gap 
is growing, between urban and rural residents, and also between those 
urban residents with the education and skills needed to succeed in a market 
economy and those without them.  There are also recent signs that some 
may be slipping back into poverty and that conditions for the very poorest 
may be worsening. 
Table 1.1 shows three ways of measuring human poverty.  One 
approach measures the percentage of the population below the national 
poverty line defined as what that society considers necessary to satisfy 
basic needs.  Because countries will set the poverty line at different levels, 
a wealthier, welfare-conscious country may have a high percentage living 
in poverty and appear poorer.  The second approach measures the 
percentage of the population below uniform poverty lines of $1 and $2 per 
day.  Even when adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP), this income-
based approach cannot fully capture actual differences in the standard of 
living of poor people.  While the first two approaches measure 
consumption and income, a third approach measures the impact of poverty 
directly.  The Human Poverty Index quantifies poverty in terms of life 
expectancy, access to food and water, and education as measured by 
literacy rates. 
Ultimately, it pays to look at the three measures concurrently.  For 
example, nearly half of the Chinese population lives on less than $2 per 
day.  But the actual standard of living in China, as measured by the HPI, 
exceeds countries with higher income such as Iran and South Africa. 
                                                                                                                                      
 29. See UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, UNDP HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2003 41 
tbl. 2.3, available at http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/pdf/hdr03_chapter_2.pdf (last visited Oct. 
30, 2004). 
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Asian countries vary dramatically in levels of poverty.  India is by far 
the worst, though poverty remains a problem in Vietnam, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, China and Thailand.  However, some countries are doing fairly 
well in reducing poverty relative to the number of people with very low 
incomes, including China, the Philippines and Vietnam.  Others have been 
doing poorly, especially Thailand, but also Indonesia.  Thailand, however, 
has improved recently as a result of economic growth and a strong ruling 
party that, while democratic, has followed the lead of other successful 
Asian states in focusing on economic rights even if at the expense of civil 
and political rights. 
Of course, relative and even absolute poverty remains an issue in 
developed countries as well.  About 9% of the population lives on less than 
$2/day in middle-income Malaysia. Surprisingly given the communitarian 
rhetoric of Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s poverty ranking is out of line with 
its income level and HDI ranking.  The U.S. has the highest rate of poverty 
at 15.3% when measured by the UNDP’s higher HPI-2 standard for 
developed countries.  More than 17% of the population in the U.S. is 
income-poor, with the poverty line set at 50% of the median adjusted 
household disposable income.30  While GNP reached a historic high in the 
United States in 1990, having grown over 25% in a decade, child poverty 
increased by 21% to where one in five American children lived in 
poverty.31  Almost 30% of the poor had no medical insurance in 1991, and 
somewhere between five and ten million Americans experienced 
homelessness in the late 1980s. 
D. Infant Mortality, Life Expectancy and Education 
Table 2.1 on infant mortality, life expectancy and education 
demonstrates that wealth and war matter, with richer and less war-prone 
Asian countries outperforming many African countries.  Japan, Hong 
Kong, and Singapore outperform the significantly wealthier U.S. in terms 
of infant mortality and life expectancy. 
Vietnam and China, which score poorly on civil and political rights, 
do well on primary school education, reaching levels comparable to that in 
the U.S.  The Philippines and Indonesia, torn by domestic strife and 
affected by the Asian financial crisis that increased poverty particularly in 
                                                                                                                                      
 30. UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000, Human Rights 
and Human Development (2000), available at http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2000/en/pdf/ 
hdr_2000_back1.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2004) (also noting that more than one in five adults in the 
U.S. is functionally illiterate). 
 31. John Gledhill, Liberalism, Socio-Economic Rights and the Politics of Identity: From Moral 
Economy to Indigenous Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS, CULTURE AND CONTEXT 70, 72-73 (Richard Wilson 
ed., 1997). 
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rural areas, suffer from relatively high rates of children who do not receive 
a primary school education.  Thailand performs surprisingly poorly on this 
measure, reflecting perhaps the impact of the Asian financial crisis. 
As Table 3.1 shows, Asian nations vary in the amount they spend on 
education, health and military as a percentage of GDP.  On the whole, 
Asian states spend more on education than health, usually considerably 
more, with the exception of Japan.  In contrast, France, the U.S. and Japan 
spend more on health than education, reflecting higher medical costs but 
also greater wealth.  No OECD country spends less than 5% of GDP on 
health, whereas most developing countries spend only 2-3%.  Given 
differences in the size of the economies, the actual amount spent varies 
widely.  The WHO estimates that $30-40 per person is the bare minimum 
needed to provide basic health services.  However, in 1997, the least 
developed countries spent on average $6/person and low-income countries 
$13, compared to $125 in upper-middle income countries and $1,356 in 
high-income countries.  Making matters even worse in poor countries, rural 
residents and those in the bottom 20% of income usually receive a 
disproportionately small share of the medical services.32 
The U.S. spends the most on the military in absolute terms, though at 
3.1% of GDP, it trails Singapore at a high 5.0%.  Only Singapore spends 
more on military than education and health combined, reflecting its security 
concerns as a small city state surrounded by larger states in which ethnic 
and religious tensions might spill over into Singapore.  Japan has the 
highest ratio of combined education and health to military spending at 9.5 
to 1.  France, Thailand, and the Philippines spend more than five times as 
much on education and health as on the military, the U.S. more than three 
times, South Korea more than two and half times, India twice as much, and 
China slightly less than twice as much.  Military expenditures may be 
offset by arms sales.  The U.S. claims 41% of the market in conventional 
weapons sales, compared to 9% for France and 1.7% for China.33   
E. Income Inequality and Wealth Distribution 
While wealth undoubtedly affects the ability of governments to 
provide education and health services to their citizens, how the government 
chooses to spend its money and how wealth is distributed among the 
members of society are also crucial factors in the quality of life of citizens, 
                                                                                                                                      
 32. UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2003, Millennium 
Development Goals: A Compact Among Nations to End Poverty (2003), available at 
http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/pdf/hdr03_overview.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2004). 
       33.     UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 2003, 
available at http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).  
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especially the most vulnerable in society.  As Table 4.1 shows, Asian 
countries differ in terms of income distribution.34  However, they all are 
more equitable than some of the worst offenders in Africa and Latin 
America.  Indonesia, a low-income country long associated with crony 
capitalism under Suharto, fares surprisingly well.  Meanwhile Malaysia, a 
middle-income country often linked with Indonesia in the Asian-values 
debates, fares rather poorly.  The Philippines not only suffers from low 
income but also extreme income inequality. 
Among the high-income countries, Hong Kong, with its laissez faire 
economic policies and colonial past, is the least equitable, though 
Singapore and the U.S. are not far behind.  Conversely, Japan once again 
scores best, with South Korea and France also doing relatively well. 
The numbers may be deceptive in that they do not indicate long-term 
trends.  China, once relatively egalitarian, is now rapidly becoming more 
polarized.35  Similarly, Malaysia reduced the spread in the 1980s only to 
see the gap widen rapidly in the 1990s. 
F. Quality of Governance 
Asian governments that supported Asian values often unapologetically 
defended their heavy-handed paternalistic ways by arguing that what 
mattered was the bottom line: economic growth, good governance, clean 
and effective civil servants.  Table 5.1 shows that the Asia region on the 
whole scores relatively high on measures of good governance, including 
political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, 
and control of corruption, with the exception of voice and accountability 
where it ranked in the 50th percentile. 
“Political stability and absence of violence” combines several 
indicators that measure the likelihood that the government will be 
overthrown or destabilized by unconstitutional or violent means, including 
terrorism.  It is included as a good governance measure because political 
instability and violence not only affect the ability of the ruling regime to 
govern but deprive citizens of the ability to peacefully select and replace 
those in power.  “Government effectiveness” measures the provision of 
                                                                                                                                      
 34. Because the underlying household surveys differ in method and in the type of data collected, 
the distribution data are not strictly comparable across countries.  The Gini index measures inequality 
over the entire distribution of income or consumption.  A value of 0 represents perfect equality, and a 
value of 100 perfect inequality.  UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
INDICATORS 2003, available at http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/indicator/indic_126_1_1.html (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2004). 
 35. See Carl Riskin et al., Introduction to The Retreat from Equality, in CHINA'S RETREAT FROM 
EQUALITY 3 (2001) ("Seldom has the world witnessed so sharp and fast a rise in inequality as has 
occurred in China."). 
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public services, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence and 
independence of civil servants, and the credibility of the government’s 
policy commitments.  Whereas government effectiveness focuses on the 
institutional inputs required to implement policies effectively, “regulatory 
quality” focuses on the policies themselves.  It includes measures of 
market-unfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate bank 
supervision, as well as perceptions of excessive regulation of foreign trade 
and business development, reflecting a bias toward neo-liberal economic 
policies.  “Rule of law” measures the extent to which people have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, how fair and predictable the 
rules are, and how well property rights are protected.  The indicators 
include perceptions of incidence of crime, the effectiveness and 
predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts.  “Control 
of corruption” measures perceptions of corruption, the effects of corruption 
on business, and “grand corruption” in the political arena. 
Again, there is wide variation within the region, largely consistent 
with levels of economic development, as indicated in Table 6.1.  In the 
high-income weight class, Singapore wins the gold in the four main 
categories of good governance: government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, rule of law and control of corruption.  It also outperforms the 
region in terms of voice and accountability and political stability, and the 
others in the high-income category for the latter but not the former.  The 
U.S. takes the silver, with France and Hong Kong vying for the bronze.  
Although Japan scored well on infant mortality, life expectancy, income 
equality and other quality of life measures, its scores on government 
effectiveness and regulatory quality leave something to be desired.  While 
it ranks relatively high in rule of law, it fares relatively poorly on the 
corruption scale mainly because of grand political corruption. 
While Taiwan outperformed the region on every measure, it 
underperformed relative to others in its high-income group on every 
measure.  However, if classified as an upper-middle-income country, as in 
the UNDP rankings, then it would do quite well relative to others in its 
income class.  South Korea consistently outperforms the regional average.  
Moreover, relative to other countries in its upper-middle-income bracket, it 
outperforms in the four main categories, although it lags behind in voice 
and accountability and political stability.36  Malaysia outperforms the 
regional average on the four main indicators of good governance and 
political stability, though it underperforms on voice and accountability.  It 
outperforms others in its group on government effectiveness and slightly on 
                                                                                                                                      
 36. See Kaufmann et al., supra note 10, available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/ 
kkz2002/index.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2004). 
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regulatory control, rule of law, and control of corruption, although it falls 
far short on voice and accountability. 
Thailand, a middle-income country according to UNDP standards but 
classified as lower-middle by the World Bank, outperforms the region and 
the average in the lower-middle income class by a wide margin on every 
dimension.  China outperforms lower-middle-income countries in political 
stability, government effectiveness, and rule of law; it does slightly better 
in control of corruption, and is about average in regulatory quality.  
However, it scores much lower on voice and accountability. The 
Philippines, also in the lower-middle-income category, scores high on 
voice and accountability, low on political stability, outperforms the income 
average on government effectiveness and regulatory quality, but lags 
slightly behind on rule of law and corruption. 
In the low-income category, India outperforms others in all 
dimensions except political stability.  Indonesia lags behind the regional 
averages and other low-income countries on political stability, rule of law 
and control of corruption, but outperforms others at its income level in 
voice and accountability, government effectiveness and slightly in 
regulatory quality.  Vietnam lags behind the region in all categories except 
political stability.  However, it outperforms others in its income class in 
political stability, government effectiveness, rule of law and control of 
corruption, though it lags far behind in voice and accountability. 
G. Law and Order and Social Stability: Crime Rates, Drug Rates, 
Suicides, Divorces and Young Mothers 
Lee Kuan Yew and other Asian leaders have often been critical of the 
high crime rates, rampant drug use and social disorder in economically 
advanced Western liberal democracies.  Rather, they stress family and 
communitarian values, social stability and law and order.  Tables 7.1 and 
8.1 demonstrate that there are significant differences in crime rates and 
other indicators of social order. 
Crimes rates must be used with caution because of differences in the 
way crimes are defined, the willingness of rape victims to come forward 
and other factors that affect the data reported, wide fluctuations from year 
to year, as well as differences in the level of economic development and 
demographic factors such as the percentage of rural population and youths.  
Notwithstanding such qualifications, the results are striking: Asian 
countries, especially in the higher income brackets, tend to have much 
lower crime rates relative to their level of economic development, 
industrialization and urbanization.  For instance, the total crime rates for 
high-income countries France and the U.S. are twice to six times the rates 
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in Japan, Singapore and Hong Kong.  The much higher crime rates hold 
across the board for property offenses such as theft and burglary, violent 
crimes such murder (which are generally considered to suffer from fewer 
problems in reporting and data collection) and drug offenses.  The U.S. 
suffers from particularly high levels of violent crime, especially rape.  
South Korean crime rates are also two to six times lower than fellow upper 
middle-income countries South Africa and Poland.  The lower-income 
countries such as China, the Philippines, Indonesia, India and Vietnam 
have lower crime rates than the wealthier countries.  Data collection is 
particularly problematic in low-income countries, making comparisons 
more difficult.  However, it would appear that crime and social disorder is a 
greater problem in India, the Philippines and Indonesia than in China, 
Vietnam and Thailand.  Thailand, however, which has low overall crime 
rates, has a surprisingly high murder rate. 
Countries vary widely in how they deal with criminals.  The U.S. also 
has the dubious distinction of the highest rate of incarceration in the world, 
as well as some of the most severe punishments.  In contrast, France and 
Japan have low rates of incarceration relative to their crime rates, and tend 
to place more emphasis on noncustodial sanctions and in Japan’s case on 
rehabilitation.  In general, however, Asian states with the exception of 
Japan rely on heavy punishments. 
Other indicators of social order such as suicide, divorce and young 
mother rates produce more mixed results, less clearly tied to levels of 
wealth, as indicated in Table 8.1.  Suicide rates are very high in Japan, 
followed by France, and then a cluster of countries including South Korea, 
China, and Hong Kong, followed by the U.S. and India.  Thailand and the 
Philippines, perhaps because of religious influences, have very low rates.  
Suicide rates are frequently higher among some segments of the population 
than others.  The rate of suicide among women in China, particularly rural 
women, is much higher than the overall national rate.   
The U.S. has a much higher divorce rate than other countries.  The 
next country, South Korea, with a surprisingly high rate, is still only half of 
that of the U.S.  Singapore’s divorce rate is relatively low.   
The birth rates to young mothers vary widely, with Indonesia, India 
and the Philippines leading the pack, followed by the U.S. and Vietnam.  In 
contrast, there are very few such births in France and the East Asian 
countries Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea or China. 
H. Provisional Summary 
• There is a wide variation within Asia in terms of human rights 
performance and other measures of quality of life. 
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• Asian countries, especially East Asian countries, tend to do poorly on 
civil and political rights relative to others in their income group.  
Moreover, even the most democratic regimes in the region score 
somewhat lower than the more liberal U.S. and France. 
• However, Asian countries tend to do much better, both relative to 
civil and political rights and also to other countries in their income 
group, on economic rights and other quality of life indicators such as 
education, infant mortality, life expectancy, law and order and social 
stability. 
• Asian governments also tend to outperform other countries in their 
income group on good governance measures. 
• Each country does better in some respects than others.  By selecting 
particular measures, one can present either a positive or negative 
image of any country. 
• Rampant rights violations, grinding poverty, appalling misery and 
suffering, and daily assaults to human dignity continue to exist in all 
countries.  Each and every country could do better, and is more and 
legally obligated to do better, in countless ways. 
III.  ACCOUNTING FOR PERFORMANCE: AN OVERVIEW  
OF THE MOST COMMON EXPLANATORY FACTORS 
What accounts for the difference in rights performance in the Asian 
region?  Quantitative studies have shown that the protection of rights is 
associated with, among other things, and in roughly descending order of 
importance: economic development, with a higher level of development 
associated with better protection of rights; international or civil wars, with 
war leading to more violations of rights; political regime type, with 
democracies protecting rights better than authoritarian or military regimes; 
regional effects, with Northern Europe and North America outperforming 
other regions, and with “region” often serving as a proxy for religion and 
culture; population size, with larger populations leading to higher rates of 
violation; and colonial history, with British colonialism linked to better 
rights protection.37  Interestingly, ratification of treaties does not translate 
into better protection for human rights, and may even have a negative 
                                                                                                                                      
 37. See generally, Steven Poe et al., supra note 15; Linda C. Keith, Constitutional Provisions for 
Individual Human Rights (1976-1996): Are They More than Mere "Window Dressing," 55(1) POL. RES. 
Q. 111, 119-23 (2002).  As discussed below, the relative importance of the factors varies depending on 
the right in question.  In particular, wealth is less important with respect to personal integrity rights than 
other rights. 
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effect, at least in the short term.38  In this section, I examine rights 
performance in Asian in light of these factors. 
A. Political Stability: War, Civil Strife, Ethnic Unrest and Terrorism 
There are no international wars involving the Asian countries in this 
study at present.  However, in the past two decades, there have been 
skirmishes in the Korean peninsula, an invasion by Vietnam of Cambodia, 
border conflicts between Vietnam and China, skirmishes in the Taiwan 
straits, several conflicts between India and its neighbors, including Pakistan 
and China, and violence in Indonesia and East Timor.  Meanwhile, the U.S. 
has been involved in some forty military actions, including wars in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, regime-changing invasions in Grenada, Panama 
and Haiti, military assistance to rebel groups in Angola, El Salvador and 
Nicaragua, and missile attacks on Lebanon, Libya, Yemen and Sudan.39 
In the near future, North Korea, having declared its intention to pursue 
the development of nuclear weapons, remains an area of concern.  The 
Taiwan independence issue could be explosive.  Chen Shuibian’s playing 
of the referendum card to boost his flagging chances for reelection and his 
commitment to a constitutional overhaul have increased tensions 
considerably.  In addition, there continue to be a number of border disputes 
in the region.  The signing of a multiparty agreement regarding the Spratly 
Islands in 2000 has eased tensions, although recent moves by China to 
develop natural gas in the South China Seas and by Vietnam to renovate an 
airport on the Islands and run tours for tourists have once again raised 
                                                                                                                                      
 38. A study of 178 countries from 1976 to 1993 found that signing the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) or even the Optional Protocol allowing individuals to raise 
complaints had no impact on state's actual behavior after controlling for other factors known to affect 
human rights implementation.  Overall human rights protection among member states was no better 
than among non-member states, all else being equal.  Linda C. Keith, The United Nations International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does It Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior?, 36 J. 
PEACE RES. 95, 106 (1999).  Another study examining compliance with respect to torture, genocide, fair 
trials, civil liberties, and women's political equality in 166 countries found similar results.  Although 
countries that ratify human rights treaties usually have somewhat better compliance ratings than 
countries that do not (without controlling for other factors), noncompliance is rampant.  Moreover, 
countries with the worst human rights records sometimes have higher ratification rates than countries 
with better human rights records.  In some cases, treaty ratification is associated with worse human 
rights ratings, leading the author to conclude that the "relatively costless step of treaty ratification may 
thereby offset pressure for costly changes in policies."  Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties 
Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1941, 1978 (2002).  Nevertheless, a country's ratification of a 
human rights treaty generally strengthens the hand of domestic and international rights advocates and 
may therefore contribute to norm change over time.  Thus in the long term, the human rights situation 
may improve. 
 39. Zoltan Grossman, From Wounded Knee to Haita: A Century of U.S. Military Interventions, at 
http://www.uwec.edu/grossmzc/interventions.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2004). 
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concerns.  The strengthening of ASEAN may also help defuse conflict in 
the region as member states become more economically interdependent.   
The main sources of instability in the region are domestic.  Nepal and 
the Philippines continue to battle rebel insurgents.  Indonesia and East 
Timor are struggling to maintain stability in the wake of East Timor’s 
declaration of independence and the downfall of Suharto.  The rise of 
terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia have further challenged 
the newly formed democratic regime’s ability to maintain social order. 
India remains one of the least stable countries in the region, in part 
because of potential international conflicts with its neighbors but also 
because of domestic threats arising from ethnic strife, terrorism and general 
discontent associated with poverty and an ineffectual government. 
China remains relatively stable, although the potential for instability 
should not be dismissed lightly.  Sources of instability include terrorist 
threats by radical groups in Xinjiang as well as a broader group of 
Xinjiangese and Tibetans who desire independence or at least greater 
autonomy.  Frequent massive demonstrations by disgruntled farmers, laid-
off urban workers and pensioners who are unable to obtain their retirement 
benefits from moribund state-owned enterprises or poorly funded welfare 
programs also have the government on edge.  In addition, China’s 
impressive economic run over the last twenty-five years is threatened by a 
high percentage of bad loans that could undermine the banking system.  
Judging from the harshness of the crackdown, the ruling regime also 
perceives advocates of democracy, certain religious groups such as Falun 
Gong and other social groups as potentially destabilizing. 
The U.S. received a relatively poor political stability rating in the 
World Bank 2002 study, ranking just higher than China and lower than 
South Korea.  The lower ranking reflects the rise of terrorism and the 
possibility of retaliation for the aggressive U.S. military policies in 
Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere in the world. 
South Korea, which has experienced violent clashes with students 
and workers in the past, continues to face the threat of conflict with North 
Korea.  As a result, its political stability rating is the same as that of 
Vietnam and lower than the regional average and the average for its income 
class.  Vietnam’s political stability rating appears to reflect the concern that 
the authoritarian socialist system is simply not sustainable, and yet the 
regime may not be able to manage political transition to a more stable form 
of government. 
Malaysia has been relatively stable.  However, the threat of terrorism 
and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, as well as concerns about the 
transition of power now that Mahathir has stepped down, have given rise to 
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worries about political stability.  Nevertheless, it remains relatively stable, 
as does Thailand.  While Thailand has a history of coups, and the military 
remains strong, it has emerged as one of the more stable democracies in the 
region.  Although terrorists have been captured in Thailand, terrorist 
activities are primarily oriented toward other states.  The authorities have 
clashed with Islamic separatist in southern provinces, however, resulting in 
more than 100 deaths and the imposition of martial law in the region.   
Hong Kong remains stable, despite recent mass demonstrations of 
several hundreds of thousands to protest the ineffectual rule of Tung Chee-
hwa, an economic recession, proposed national security legislation required 
under the Basic Law, and limited political reforms.  The pace of 
democratization in Hong Kong and China remains an issue, and there will 
inevitably be tensions between Beijing and Hong Kong under the novel one 
country, two systems approach.  Nevertheless, there is little chance of 
political instability given Hong Kong’s politically cautious, business-
minded citizenry and the fundamental reality that Hong Kong is part of the 
PRC. 
Japan, France and Singapore all rank high on political stability.  
However, Japan’s sending of soldiers to Iraq has created tensions at home, 
with many citizens concerned that Japan’s increasing presence in U.N. 
peacekeeping and nation-building operations runs afoul of constitutional 
limits on the military. 
More generally, the war on terrorism has resulted in threats to civil 
liberties in all countries.  In addition to hurriedly passing a series of anti-
terrorist laws, the U.S. has pressured other countries in Asia to beef up their 
national security laws, often dangling the bait of bilateral trade benefits as 
an inducement.  Ironically, prior to 9-11, the U.S. State Department and 
Western rights organizations routinely criticized Asian countries for 
cracking down on dissidents, insurgents, terrorists, and others who threaten 
social order on the ground that the life of the nation was not at stake as 
literally required under Article 4 of the ICCPR to justify the derogation of 
civil and political rights.  Yet surely the threats faced by many Asian 
countries have been and continue to be more serious than the threats 
currently faced by the U.S. Isolated acts of terrorism, deplorable as they 
may be, are not likely to bring the world’s mightiest military power to its 
knees.  In any event, rights advocates worry that U.S. pressure will set the 
clock back in societies that have fought to eliminate or restrict the use of 
national security laws to harass political opponents.  
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B. Economic Development 
Some Asian governments have cited their economic record in 
defending the need to rule with a strong hand.  On the whole the Asian 
region has done extremely well in achieving economic growth, particularly 
compared to other regions.  However, the level of development varies 
widely in Asia. 
The U.S. leads the pack with GDP/capita (PPP) of U.S. $34,320, as 
indicated in Table 9.1.  Also in the high-income category are Japan, Hong 
Kong, France, and Singapore in the $22,000 to $25,000 range.  South 
Korea and Taiwan are in the upper-middle category, with PPP levels at 
slightly less than half of the U.S. and about two-thirds that of the high-
income Asian countries.  Malaysia and Thailand are in the middle, with 
PPP levels about one-fifth to one-fourth that of the U.S., and one-third that 
of rich Asian countries.  China and the Philippines are in the lower-middle 
group, with one-eighth of the per capita wealth of the U.S. and one-sixth 
that of rich Asian countries.  Indonesia, India and Vietnam fall into the 
low-income category. 
As the scatterplots in Figure 4.1 graphically portray, level of 
development is clearly related to better protection of human rights.  The 
correlations in Table 10.1 demonstrate that the relationship between wealth 
and human development40 and good governance is extremely strong.41  The 
relationship for voice and accountability is also strong, and statistically 
significant.  Although statistically significant, the relationship between 
personal integrity rights globally and GDP is weaker.  This is due to police 
violence and other acts classified as torture even in rich countries, and 
because rich countries also react to war, terrorism and political stability by 
limiting civil and political rights and detaining suspects in ways that are 
considered arbitrary detention under international human rights standards.42 
                                                                                                                                      
 40. There is also a strong relationship between wealth and women's rights as measured by the 
UNDP's Gender Development Index (GDI) index (r=.93).  The GDI index is highly correlated with the 
HDI index (r=.999).  The GDI is a composite indicator that measures the average achievement of a 
population in the same dimensions as the HDI while adjusting for gender inequalities in the level of 
achievement in the three basic aspects of human development.  UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, 
UNDP Gender-related Development Index (2003 statistics), available at http://www.undp.org/ 
hdr2003/indicator/indic_196_1_1.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).  It uses the same variables as the 
HDI, disaggregated by gender.  Given the high correlation, the scatterplot for GDI is virtually identical 
to that for HDI.  Even the regional correlations differ only slightly as indicated in Table 10.1. 
 41. Three variables (Rule of Law, Government Effectiveness and Control of Corruption) are so 
highly correlated (Pearson r > .91) that they appear to measure the same thing. Reliability analysis 
confirms this (alpha = .97), and so the variables have been standardized and combined into a single 
good governance scale. 
 42. Keith, supra note 37, at 119 (citing eight studies and concluding that "empirical evidence has 
consistently shown that higher levels of economic development reduce political repression," but finding 
that the factors affecting personal integrity were in order of importance a large population, civil war, a 
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Wealth then explains the brunt of variation in human rights 
performance around the world,43 strongly supporting the arguments calling 
for greater emphasis on the right to development and more assistance from 
wealthy western liberal democracies.  To be sure, the high correlations do 
not indicate the direction of causality.  Wealth may cause better rights 
performance, or better protection of rights may lead to more wealth.  
Moreover, wealth is not the only factor or the most determinative for all 
rights in all cases.  Some countries in each income group beat expectations 
while others fall far short.  Of 174 countries, 97 scored higher on HDI, the 
indicator of social and economic rights, than their GDP ranking, while 69 
scored lower.44 
There are also strong regional differences that weaken the correlation 
between wealth and civil and political rights.  East Asian states with a 
Confucian heritage and Middle East states with an Islamic tradition are less 
supportive of civil and political rights, even if wealthy.  Latin American 
states, with a history of corporatism, patron-client relationships, corruption 
and large income gaps, and African countries, with traditions of 
collectivism, strong ethnic affinities and more recently dysfunctional and 
corrupt leadership, are also less supportive of civil and political rights. 
Cultural factors then play a role in some contexts and with respect to 
some rights.45  To be sure, cultural traits are also closely correlated with 
                                                                                                                                      
change in democracy from lowest to highest level, international war, provisions for fair trials, GDP, and 
provisions for public trials).  See also Christian Davenport, "Constitutional Promises" and Repressive 
Reality: A Cross-National Time-Series Investigation of Why Political and Civil Liberties are 
Suppressed, 58(3) J. POL. 627, 644-45 (1996) (impact of economic development minimal in his study 
and three others); Conway Henderson, Conditions Affecting Use of Political Repression, 35 J. 
CONFLICT RES. 120, 132-34 (1991) (democracy, inequality, and economic growth were statistically 
significant predictors of political repression, though level of economic development was not).  
Economic growth might be an important indicator for personal integrity rights because people are less 
likely to take to the streets when their material standards are improving.  In contrast, economic 
downturns, particularly at low levels of development, frequently result in regime change.  Adam 
Przeworski & Fernando Limongi, Modernization: Theories and Facts, 49 (2) WORLD POL. 155, 169 
(1997).  While there is general agreement that domestic conflict is a greater threat to personal integrity 
rights than interstate conflicts, some studies have found that interstate conflict is a significant factor 
while others have found that interstate conflict is not a significant factor.  See, e.g., M. Rodwan 
Abouharb and David L. Cingranelli, The Impact of Structural Adjustment on Government Respect for 
Human Rights 1982-2001, paper presented at the annual meeting of The American Political Science 
Association, Chicago, Sept. 2, 2004, available at   http://www.apsanet.org/mtgs/ (last visited Oct. 30, 
2004). 
 43. See UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 32.  Although Figure 4.1 presents simple 
correlations without controlling for other factors, many of the studies cited in note 15 do control for 
other factors, and still find a strong, statistically significant relationship between wealth and rights 
performance. 
 44. See id. 
 45. Notwithstanding the strong correlation between wealth and good governance, at least one 
study has found that cultural values are more predictive of rule of law and good governance than GDP.  
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wealth, as well as such demographic factors as age, education, rural-urban 
ratios, and occupation.46  Moreover, the relationship between wealth and 
human rights performance in Asia and the Middle East is consistently 
strong except with respect to civil and political rights.  This supports the 
view that there is a culturally-based antipathy to liberal values that explains 
the variance.  In contrast, the relationship between wealth and all types of 
rights is consistently weak in Latin America and Africa, suggesting that the 
culprit is corrupt and dysfunctional governments that serve the rich, if they 
serve anyone, at the expense of the general populace. 
Finally, it bears noting that rights performance of any country may 
deteriorate rapidly because of war, economic stagnation, natural disasters 
or problems like HIV/AIDS, though again, poor countries are likely to 
suffer disproportionately. 
Whereas most studies use GDP as the independent variable, some 
studies have found that economic growth rates are also important to the 
protection of rights.  Again, there is significant variation in terms of long-
term growth rates in the region.  Only six countries—Japan, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and China—experienced sustained growth 
of over 5% for the period from 1965 until 1995.47  Thailand, Malaysia and 
Indonesia grew more slowly, at around 3.5% per year.  Seven countries, 
including North Korea, Mongolia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, the 
Philippines and Myanmar, averaged less than 2% growth.  Growth rates in 
                                                                                                                                      
Licht et al., supra note 7.  The study found that countries that emphasized autonomy and egalitarianism 
had higher levels of rule of law, accountability, and less corruption, whereas countries that emphasized 
embeddedness and hierarchy had a lower level of rule of law, accountability, and worse corruption.  In 
short, English-speaking and Western Europe scored significantly higher than other regions.  The authors 
suggest that cultural orientation in East Asia may make it more difficult to implement rule of law, 
restrict corruption, and increase accountability or that "good governance" in Asia may differ in some 
respects from "good governance" in liberal democratic Western countries. 
Good governance in Asian countries no doubt differs in significant respects from good governance 
in rich, liberal, democratic Western countries once one examines in more detail the broad variables of 
rule of law, accountability, and corruption.  Nevertheless, Asian states have outperformed other regions 
in terms of rule of law on the same World Bank good governance scales used by the Licht et al., supra 
note 7, suggesting that culture may not be as important at least in Asia as the authors suggest.. 
 46. See HOFSTEDE, supra note 14, at 83-84, 161-62, 251 (wealth biggest factor with respect to 
individualism versus collectivism, the power distance index, which measures the extent to which less 
powerful members of society accept that power is distributed unequally, and uncertainty avoidance, 
which measures the extent to which people are comfortable in unstructured situations); RONALD 
INGLEHART, MODERNIZATION AND POSTMODERNIZATION: CULTURAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL 
CHANGE IN 43 SOCIETIES 74-77 (1997) (GNP/capita strongly correlated with both wellbeing versus 
survival, and secular-rational versus traditional authority); Smith et al., supra note 8, at 200 (GDP 
strongly correlated with autonomy versus conservatism, and egalitarianism versus hierarchy); Geert 
Hofstede & Michael H. Bond, The Confucius Connection: From Cultural Roots to Economic Growth, 
16 ORG. DYNAMICS 4, 16 (Spring 1988) (relating Confucian work dynamism to economic growth). 
 47. Henry S. Rowen, The Political and Social Foundations of the Rise of East Asia, in BEHIND 
EAST ASIAN GROWTH 2 (Henry S. Rowen ed., 1998). 
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Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam increased during the 1980s and 
1990s up until the financial crisis. 
Several points bear noting.  First, the period of rapid growth generally 
occurred under an authoritarian regime.  However, not all of the 
authoritarian regimes in the region have succeeded in achieving high 
growth rates (e.g., Myanmar, North Korea), nor have all the democracies 
(e.g., the Philippines, India).  Regime type is not as important as the 
stability of the regime and variations within regimes.48  In particular, 
regimes that are market-oriented, dominated by technocrats, and relatively 
free from corruption are more likely to be successful. 
Second, of the Asian countries that have experienced sustained 
growth, most have enjoyed legal systems that comply with the standards of 
rule of law, at least in their handling of commercial matters.  Although the 
political regimes may not have been democratic and the legal system may 
not have provided much protection for civil and political rights in some 
cases, the Asian countries that experienced economic growth generally 
scored high with respect to the legal protection of economic interests.  A 
survey of economic freedoms in 102 countries between 1993 and 1995 
found that seven of the top twenty countries were in Asia.49  Economic 
freedoms include protection of the value of money, free exchange of 
property, a fair judiciary, few trade restrictions, labor market freedoms, and 
freedom from economic coercion by political opponents.  With the possible 
exception of China, the legal systems of the six countries that have 
achieved highest economic growth measure up favorably in terms of 
economic freedoms and rule of law, particularly with respect to commercial 
matters.  In contrast, the legal systems of the lowest performing countries 
are among the weakest in the region.  The data for Asian countries is 
consistent with the general evidence from other countries that demonstrates 
that rule of law is necessary if not sufficient in most cases for sustained 
economic development.50 
Third, all else being equal, authoritarian regimes tend to outperform 
democratic regimes at relatively low levels of economic development.51  
                                                                                                                                      
 48. See Przeworski & Limongi, supra note 42, at 178-79 (discussing the factors that contribute to 
the stability of regimes). 
 49. Rowen, supra note 47, at 6-7. 
 50. See RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 458-62 (2002) 
(suggesting that rule of law is necessary for sustained economic development). 
 51. See Robert J. Barro, Democracy: A Recipe for Growth?, in CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT: AN ASIAN PERSPECTIVE 67, 89-98 (Muhammad G. Quibria & J. Malcolm Dowling 
eds., 1996) (analyzing the effects of economic development on democracy, and concluding that 
"countries at low levels of economic development typically do not sustain democracy"). 
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Thus, promoting democracy in very poor countries may be putting the cart 
before the horse. 
Fourth, some Asian countries, including China, may not yet have 
reached the level of development that makes it likely that there will be a 
transition to democracy, and even if there were, that democracy would be 
sustainable.52  While democracy proponents often claim that authoritarian 
regimes are particularly vulnerable to economic downturns, so are 
democracies, at least at relatively low levels of growth.53 
Fifth, when the conditions for a durable or stable democracy are not 
present, the transition to democracy often impedes economic development, 
at least in the short term. 
Sixth, economic development is not sufficient for political reform and 
the emergence of democracy.  Countries may develop economically and 
not become liberal democracies, at least for a considerable period.  Hong 
Kong and Singapore are good examples. 
Seventh, higher levels of prosperity and economic development are 
likely to lead to a growing demand for democracy—Taiwan, South Korea, 
Thailand, Indonesia and Hong Kong are good examples.  Whether or not 
economic development is the cause of democratization, in the long term, 
economically advanced countries are likely to be, and to remain, 
democracies. 
Finally, as discussed in the next section, democratization does not 
necessarily lead to an improvement in human rights. 
As for the relation of growth to rights rather than to democracy, high 
growth rates may in the long term lead to better protection of rights as a 
society becomes wealthier, and may in the short term diminish popular 
discontent and opposition to government policies, thus reducing the need to 
suppress political dissent or take harsh actions to curb social protests.  But 
higher growth rates are also consistent with rising inequality and political 
oppression, as the experiences of several Asian countries demonstrate.  As 
indicated in Table 11.1, China and Vietnam have enjoyed the highest 
growth rates in recent years, explaining to some extent the legitimacy of the 
authoritarian governments and the relative political stability despite severe 
restrictions on civil and political rights.  Similarly, Taiwan, Singapore, 
Hong Kong, South Korea, and Malaysia enjoyed high growth rates during 
their authoritarian years, although growth rates have tapered off in recent 
years as the size of the economy has grown and because of other factors, 
such as the effect of the Asian financial crisis.  India’s growth rate has been 
                                                                                                                                      
 52. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 50, at 521-22 (comparing views on whether China has reached 
the minimum level of development required to sustain democracy). 
 53. Przeworski & Limongi, supra note 42, at 177-78. 
021405 PEERENBOOM.DOC 4/26/2005  4:29 PM 
2004] SHOW ME THE MONEY 101 
relatively high, though only half of that of China.  Asia’s other developing 
democracy, the Philippines, has struggled economically, posting some of 
the lowest rates in the region. 
In addition to levels of development and growth rates, researchers 
have studied the effect of FDI and foreign assistance on human rights.  
Unfortunately, such studies have been inconclusive.54  Taking a look at the 
region, China clearly receives the most FDI, and indeed was the leading 
destination in the world for FDI in 2002.  In terms of FDI as a percentage 
of GDP however, the countries ranked as follows in 2001: Hong Kong 
14.1, Singapore 10.1, Vietnam 4.0, France 4.0, China 3.8, Thailand 3.3, 
U.S. 1.3, South Korea 0.8, India 0.7, Malaysia 0.6, and Indonesia 2.4.55 
Consistent with the general studies, it is difficult to draw any firm 
conclusions from these figures for the Asian region.  In most cases, foreign 
businesses pursue their own economic interests.  While there may be some 
diffusion of norms, in some cases the better-off working in foreign 
enterprises tend to be conservative defenders of the status quo.56  
Moreover, foreign investors themselves have very different records on 
labor rights issues.  In China, large multinational companies from the U.S., 
Europe and Japan provide similar treatment to employees as in their own 
country.  However, investors from other countries in the region often 
engage in abusive practices.57 
While FDI may stimulate growth and provide much needed jobs, it 
can also contribute to financial crisis.  The Asian financial crisis clearly 
resulted in lower living standards in many Asian countries.  In Thailand, 
poverty levels jumped from eight percent in 1996 to twenty percent in 1998 
as a result of the financial crisis, eliminating much of the progress made in 
last twenty years.  Some 800,000 school children and college students were 
forced to drop out of school; social problems such as alcoholism, 
depression and suicide increased; immigrants were no longer welcome; and 
trafficking in children and prostitution increased.58  Fortunately, Thailand 
                                                                                                                                      
 54. Mosley and Uno, supra note 4. 
 55. UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, Human Development Indicators (2003), available at 
http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/indicator/indic_151_1_1.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2004). 
 56. PEERENBOOM, supra note 50, at 530. 
 57. See generally ANITA CHAN, CHINA'S WORKERS UNDER ASSAULT: EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE 
IN A GLOBALIZING ECONOMY (2001) (conducting a review on the various types of labor-rights abuses 
suffered by Chinese workers).  
 58. KENNETH CHRISTIE & DENNY ROY, THE POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN EAST ASIA 166 
(Peter Van Ness ed., 2001). 
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has now recovered from the financial crisis, and regained or even improved 
on pre-crisis levels for human development and other rights.59 
Although studies have reached different conclusions about the impact 
of foreign aid on human rights, the impact seems to be limited in most 
cases.60  What is abundantly clear from such studies is that aid is more 
often determined by the strategic, commercial and political concerns of the 
donor, rather than given out of pure altruism.  At minimum, it is safe to say 
that the human rights record of the recipient is rarely the determining 
factor, and that there is a significant gap between a rhetorical commitment 
to democracy and human rights and the deliverance of aid and the pursuit 
of other goals that undermine democracy and human rights.61  Looking at 
the amount of ODA received (U.S. millions) and the rate per capita in the 
region, India clearly leads in the total amount of aid received, although 
Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines have higher rates per capita: India 
1705/1.7; Indonesia 1500/7.0, China 1460/1.1, Vietnam 1439/18.1, the 
Philippines 577/7.5, Thailand 281/4.6, Malaysia 27/1.1, Hong Kong 
3.6/0.2; Singapore 1.0/0.5.  Again, no straightforward conclusions seem to 
flow from these numbers, although the relatively poor civil and political 
rights records of Vietnam, China and Indonesia suggest that aid alone is not 
an effective lever for changing government policies in that area. 
C.  Political Regime: Democracy, Authoritarianism and Their Mixed 
Offspring 
Many studies using a variety of methods and definitions find that 
democracy reduces human rights violations.62  However, the studies tend to 
assume a linear relationship: marginal improvement in democratization 
leads to a similar improvement in protection of human rights.  Yet many 
qualitative studies have found that democratization has not led to better 
protection of human rights in the countries studied.63  Despite the much-
                                                                                                                                      
 59. See Muntarbhorn, supra note 24 (discussing Thailand's economic recovery and its current 
government's promotion of human rights). 
 60. Patrick M. Regan, U.S. Economic Aid and Political Repression: An Empirical Evaluation of 
U.S. Foreign Policy, 48 POL. RES. Q. 613, 625 (1995). 
 61. See Bethany Barratt, Aiding Whom? Competing Explanations of Middle-Power Foreign Aid 
Decisions, paper presented at the annual meeting of The American Political Science Association, 
Philadelphia, Aug. 28-31, 2003, at APSA, supra note 6, at 24, 26 (finding no relationship between 
British and Canadian foreign aid and the human rights record of recipients); see also Steven C. Poe, 
Human Rights and US Foreign Aid: A Review of Quantitative Studies and Suggestions for Future 
Research, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 499, 499-512 (1990) (summarizing seven studies that focus on human 
rights and foreign assistance, and noting that five of these studies "flow against the hypothesis that 
human rights considerations affect the foreign aid decisionmaking process"). 
 62. See generally Davenport & Armstrong, supra note 14; Landman, supra note 19. 
 63. Davenport & Armstrong, supra note 14. 
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vaunted third wave of democratization in the 1980s and 1990s, regimes that 
combined meaningful democratic elections with authoritarian features 
outnumbered liberal democracies in developing countries during the 
1990s.64 
A number of quantitative studies support the disconcerting results of 
the qualitative studies by showing that the third wave has not led to a 
decrease in political repression, with some studies showing that political 
terror and violations of personal integrity rights actually increased in the 
1980s.65  Other studies have found that there are non-linear effects to 
democratization: transitional or illiberal democracies increase repressive 
action.  Fein described this phenomenon as “more murder in the middle” – 
as political space opens, the ruling regime is subject to greater threats to its 
power and so resorts to violence.66  More recent studies have also 
concluded that the level of democracy matters: below a certain level 
democratic regimes oppress as much as non-democratic regimes.67 
Democracy consists of different elements or dimensions, and thus 
most studies use a composite index.  The Polity IV measure increasingly 
favored by researchers is a 21-point scale made up of five components: 
competitiveness of executive recruitment, competitiveness of participation, 
executive constraints, openness of executive recruitment and regulation of 
participation.  Other composite measures of democracy include civil 
                                                                                                                                      
 64. Levitsky & Way, supra note 3. 
 65. McCann & Gibney, supra note 19, at 23-25; see also Reilly, supra note 6 (noting that over the 
period from 1976-1996, the number of countries with the best score actually decreased, countries with 
the worst score increased, while the mean remained about the same); Landman supra note 19 (noting an 
increase in violations of personal integrity and torture between 1985 and 1993). 
 66. Helen Fein, More Murder in the Middle: Life-Integrity Violations and Democracy in the 
World, 1987, 17 HUM. RTS. Q.  170, 174, 184 (1995). 
 67. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., Thinking Inside the Box: A Closer Look at Democracy and 
Human Rights, paper presented at the annual meeting of The American Political Science Association, 
Philadelphia, Aug. 28-31, 2003, at APSA, supra note 6, at 15.  See also Davenport & Armstrong, supra 
note 14 (studying the influence of democracy on human rights violations, and suggesting that 
"authorities do not perceive any change in the costs and benefits of repression until the highest levels of 
democracy have been achieved"); Keith, supra note 37, at 129 (democracy has only minor impact on 
personal integrity rights, although transition from lowest level to highest level produces a more 
substantial impact).  Another study found that democracy leads to improvement in human rights 
performance within the first year of holding elections, but then leads to increased repression in 
following years.  See S.C. Zanger, A Global Analysis of the Effect of Regime Changes on Life Integrity 
Violations, 1977-93, 37 (2) J. PEACE RES. 213, 216-18, 229 (2000).  Contrastingly, while a regime 
change from democracy to authoritarianism brings repression in its first year, it results in a decrease in 
repression in subsequent years.  Moreover, the study distinguished between democracies, authoritarian 
regimes, and mixed regimes – i.e., those regimes that score in the middle of the Polity III index, as most 
new democracies are likely to do.  Transitions from an authoritarian regime to a mixed regime lead to 
more repression in the year of change, a decrease in the first year, and then an increase in the second 
year.  In sum, the results support the argument that human rights improvements are consistently 
obtained only in full democracies.  Id. 
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liberties, freedom of press, minority protection, and so on.  Which elements 
matter the most for the protection of human rights?68  Is there a sequencing 
effect that would recommend increasing political participation before 
increasing constraints on the executive, or vice versa?  de Mesquita et al. 
found that political participation and limits on executive authority are more 
significant than other aspects, but that there is no human rights benefit at all 
until the very highest levels of political participation and executive 
constraints are achieved.  However, these levels require moderate progress 
on each of the other subdimensions.  In short, “there is no significant 
increase in human rights with an incremental increase in the level of 
democracy until we reach the point where executive constraints are greatest 
and where multiple parties compete regularly in elections and there has 
been at least one peaceful exchange of power between the parties. . . .  Put 
more starkly, human rights progress only reliably appears toward the end of 
the democratization process.”69 
Policymakers are again faced with morally ambiguous results.  
Democracy appears to be related to both economic growth and human 
rights, but the human rights benefits of democracy may occur only once 
democracy is consolidated.  Moreover, all else being equal, authoritarian 
regimes tend to outperform democratic regimes at relatively low levels of 
economic development, while democracies are unstable at low levels of 
development and susceptible to collapse when economic performance 
suffers.70  This supports the views of several Asian leaders who argue that 
economic growth should come before democratic reforms.71  On the other 
hand, advocates of a growth-first approach may be troubled by studies 
showing that IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programs lead to 
more repression, at least in the short term, although the long-term results 
are variable.72  At minimum, policymakers should strive to avoid 
                                                                                                                                      
 68. As noted in de Mesquita et al., supra note 67, at 5-6, one of the disadvantages of using 
composite measures of democracy is that it is not clear how democracy promotes human rights.  The 
factors measured by studies of democracy are only loosely tied to theories about why democracy 
protects human rights. 
 69. Id at 15. 
 70. Barro, supra note 51, at 89, 98; Przeworski & Limongi, supra note 42, at 177-78. 
 71. Democracy advocates may also be concerned by studies indicating that a shift to democratic 
elections has led to greater spending on primary education in some countries at the expense of 
secondary and tertiary education.  See David Stasavage, Democracy and Education Spending (July 
2004), at http://personal.lse.ac.uk/stasavag/education-AJPSfinal.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2004). 
 72. M. Rodwan Abouharb & David L. Cingranelli, Money Talks? The Impact of World Bank 
Structural Adjustment Lending on Human Rights, 1981-2000, paper presented at the annual meeting of 
The American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, Aug. 28-31, 2003, at APSA, supra note 6, at 
13-14.  This study of 161 countries found that after controlling for existing circumstances within a 
country, there was an improvement in personal integrity rights during the year the loan was received, 
but then deterioration in the following two years once structural adjustment conditions were imposed.  
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sacrificing the short-term interests of the poorest members of society at the 
altar of long-term growth by adopting relief measures to protect the most 
vulnerable. 
The experiences of Asian countries with democratization are largely 
consistent with the findings of these multiple-country studies.  In 
Indonesia, there have been numerous human rights violations after the fall 
of Suharto, most notably with respect to ethnic violence, the tragedy in East 
Timor, and the violence that marred the 1999 elections.73  
Similarly, Amnesty International reported in 1993 that the human 
rights situation had not substantially improved under the democratic regime 
in South Korea.74  Even the former rights activist and President Kim Dae 
Jung was unwilling or unable to do away with the strict National Security 
Law despite his campaign promises.  To be sure, the number of persons 
arrested for violating the National Security Law has decreased in recent 
years.  Nevertheless, almost 80 people were arrested in the first year of the 
presidency of former human rights lawyer Roh Moo-hyun.  Moreover, 
while the government is more hesitant to invoke national security concerns 
to justify rights violations, in practice law enforcement agencies continue to 
emphasize confession and make use of “special interrogation rooms” 
maintained in the prosecutors’ office.75 
Although Cambodia held elections in 1993 and 1998, the period was 
marked by battles between government armed forces and the Khmer 
Rouge, resulting in continued human rights violations including murder, 
rape, hostage-taking, and secret detention.76  The government offered 
amnesty to key leaders and supporters of the Khmer Rouge, much to the 
dismay of many rights advocates.  Nevertheless, stability remained an issue 
with a preemptive coup by Hun Sen in 1997 in which more than fifty 
people were killed, many of them shot in the back of the head after arrest.77 
                                                                                                                                      
Id. at 14.  This suggests that governments improve their performance to impress the World Bank and 
secure loans, but that the austerity measures associated with structural adjustment policies lead to 
violations of rights thereafter.  See also Linda C. Keith & Steven C. Poe, The United States, the IMF, 
and Human Rights: A Policy-Relevant Approach, in THE UNITED STATES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 
LOOKING INWARD AND OUTWARD 281-82 (David P. Forsythe ed., 2000) (weak short term increase in 
level of repression following receipt of IMF loan); Abouharb & Cingranelli, supra note 42 (finding that 
there was a significant increase in the probability of torture, extra-judicial killing, and political 
disappearances in the three years following a Structural Adjustment Agreement). 
 73. Juwana, supra note 23. 
 74. AMNESTY INT'L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1993, available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aireport/ar93/index.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2004). 
 75. Chaihark Hahm, Human Rights in Korea, in THE RIGHTS OF ASIANS TODAY, supra note 14. 
 76. One can, of course, challenge whether Cambodia or Singapore or Malaysia are democracies in 
the relevant sense. 
 77. David Chandler, Will There Be a Trial for the Khmer Rouge?, 14 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 67, 79 
(2000). 
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In the Philippines, democracy has not resolved pressing 
socioeconomic problems.  Under Ramos, the percentage living in poverty 
was reduced, but the gap between rich and poor grew.78  There have also 
been numerous rights violations, including disappearances, extrajudicial 
killings, arbitrary arrests, and prolonged detention, as the government 
continues to struggle against insurgents.79  Consistent with popular views in 
other countries threatened by terrorism and insurgents, most Filipino 
citizens apparently do not consider the government’s tough treatment of 
terrorists as human rights violations.  Preoccupied with fighting terrorists, 
the government has been too weak to deal with corruption and violence, 
and democracy has been driven by cronyism, family networks in the 
countryside, and personalities.  Meanwhile, in Burma, a weak democratic 
government led to discontent and provided an incentive for military 
intervention in politics.80 
Moreover, a large number of citizens in Taiwan and South Korea 
continue to harbor serious doubts about democracy.  Taiwan and South 
Korea have generally been considered success stories in that they have 
achieved relatively mature democracies, although the violence and 
allegations of impropriety in the recent presidential election in Taiwan have 
tarnished Taiwan’s image.  With a 2.0 ranking on Freedom House’s 
political rights and civil liberties scale, they are considered to be “liberal 
democracies,” despite shortcomings in rule of law and restraints on 
executive power.81  Nevertheless, “support for democracy lags well behind 
the levels detected in other emerging and established democracies.  And on 
some dimensions of belief, the two publics exhibit a residual preference for 
authoritarian or nondemocratic principles, akin to the portrait of traditional 
or ‘Asian values.’”82  Global studies suggest that democracy becomes 
stable when 70% of the populace insists on democracy as the best form of 
government.83  However, only slightly more than half of citizens in South 
Korea and Taiwan believe that democracy is the best form of government, 
while 30% of Koreans and 12% of Taiwanese maintain that an 
                                                                                                                                      
 78. CHRISTIE & ROY, supra note 58, at 187. 
 79. Id. at 188, 191-92. 
 80. Neil A. Englehart, State Capacity and Democracy: A Theoretical Argument with a Burmese 
Case Study and a Time-Series Cross-Section Analysis, paper presented at the annual meeting of The 
American Political Science Association, Chicago, Sept. 2, 2004, available at 
http://www.apsanet.org/mtgs/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2004) (arguing that modernization theories were 
right to suggest that trying to build democracy before building the state is likely to backfire). 
      82.    FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2003: SURVEY METHODOLOGY, available at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/methodology.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2004). 
 82. Yun-han Chu et al., Halting Progress in Korea and Taiwan, 12 J. DEMOCRACY 122, 124 
(2001). 
 83. Id. 
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authoritarian government is sometimes preferable.  Support for democracy 
declined in South Korea after the financial crisis and the scandals in the 
Kim Young Sam presidency, including one involving his son.  Also 
consistent with the Asia-values platform, some 65% of Koreans claim 
economic development is more important than democracy, while only one 
out of seven choose democracy.84 
Numerous polls throughout the region show similar majoritarian 
support for economic development and social stability over democracy and 
civil and political rights.85  This is perhaps not surprising given that 
between 60% and 84% of Indonesians, Indians, Filipinos, Vietnamese and 
Chinese identify economic difficulties as their number one concern, with 
37% of Indonesians, 44% of Indians, 57% of Filipinos, 31% of Vietnamese 
and 18% of Chinese claiming difficulties in affording adequate food.86 
In other parts of the developing world, large majorities also are willing 
to trade off democracy for economic growth.  More than twice as many 
Latin Americans would choose development over democracy, while 50% 
agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that they would not mind 
having a non-democratic government if it could solve economic 
problems.87 
                                                                                                                                      
 84. Id. 
 85. See Susan Sim, Human Rights: Bridging the Gulf, STRAITS TIMES, Oct. 21, 1995, at 32.  A 
survey of academics, think tank experts, officials, businesspeople, journalists, and religious and cultural 
leaders found significant differences between Asians and Americans.  The former chose an orderly 
society, harmony, and accountability of public officials, in descending order, as the three most 
important societal values.  In contrast, the Americans chose freedom of expression, personal freedom, 
and the rights of the individual.  See also Bridget Welsh, Attitudes Toward Democracy in Malaysia, 36 
ASIAN SURV. 882, 884, 894 (1996) (reporting that a survey of Malaysians in 1994 found that the 
majority were willing to limit democracy, particularly when social order was threatened, and that fears 
of instability and Asian values led to limited support for democracy; also noting that respondents were 
willing to sacrifice freedom of speech in the face of threats to social order, and that only forty percent 
thought the press should be free to discuss sensitive issues, while only fifty-two percent thought it 
should be free to criticize the government, with many of those favoring constructive criticism).  For 
several studies that show the high value assigned to order in China and limited demand for democracy, 
see PEERENBOOM, supra note 50, at 53-56. 
 86. THE PEW RES. CENTER, THE PEW GLOBAL ATTITUDES PROJECT, What do Asians think about 
their lives? (2002), available at http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=165 (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2004). 
 87. COMISIÓN DE PROMOCIÓN DEL PERÚ, LATINOBAROMETER: PUBLIC OPINION IN LATIN 
AMERICA (2002) [hereinafter LATINOBAROMETER].  See also Juan Forero, Latin America is Growing 
Impatient with Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2004, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/24/international/americas/24PERU.html?ex=1089065297&ei=1&en=
7f452d7bbb6ecb14 (United Nations Report finds that 56% of Latin Americans said economic progress 
is more important than democracy.  Massive discontent has led to the downfall of six elected leaders 
after violent unrest, growing support for neo-authoritarian leaders, and the granting of extrajudicial 
powers to effective leaders.  There have even been calls in Peru for the return of the authoritarian leader 
Alberto Fujimori, who was run out of office on corruption charges). 
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Moreover, just as impoverished Latin Americans have become 
disillusioned with the third wave of democracy and are dissatisfied with 
their governments, between 75% and 92% of citizens are dissatisfied with 
the government in democratic Japan, South Korea, India, Indonesia and the 
Philippines.  In contrast, almost half of Chinese and almost 70% of 
Vietnamese are satisfied with the government.88   
Interestingly, Asian citizens are generally satisfied with their own 
lives and optimistic about the future, with between half and three-quarters 
of respondents in India, China, the Philippines, South Korea, Vietnam, 
Indonesia, and Bangladesh believing their lives would improve in the next 
five years and less than 10% worried that their lives would not improve 
during the same period.89  However, beliefs about future growth and 
improvement in personal circumstances do not necessarily translate into 
satisfaction with the current government in democratic states.  One can 
only speculate about what the implications for democracy would be if 
people came to believe they would be worse off in the future under a 
democratic regime. 
Even when many Asians prefer democracy, they may prefer 
majoritarian or nonliberal variants to liberal democracy.  Nearly two-thirds 
of Koreans agreed with the statement that “If we have political leaders who 
are morally upright, we can let them decide everything”, 40% believed that 
“the government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to 
be discussed in society,” while 47% believed that “if people have too many 
different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic.”90  In contrast to South 
Koreans and Taiwanese, there is overwhelming support for democracy 
among Thais, with an astounding 90% satisfied with the way democracy 
works in Thailand and 85% maintaining that democracy is always 
preferable to authoritarianism.91  Nevertheless, half of Thais still rank 
economic development as more important than democracy,92 suggesting 
                                                                                                                                      
 88. THE PEW RES. CENTER, supra note 86. 
 89. Japan, where 39% of people felt they lost ground in recent years, was the exception. Only 34% 
of Japanese are optimistic about the chances of improvement in the next few years, with 27% 
anticipating being worse off.  Id. 
 90. Chong-min Park & Doh Chull Shin, Do Asian Values Deter Popular Support for Democracy?  
The Case of South Korea, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of The Association for Asian Studies, 
San Diego, Mar. 4-7, 2004, at 9, 13 (unpublished manuscript, on file with journal).  
 91. Robert B. Albritton & Thawilwadee Bureekul, The Meaning of Democracy in a Developing 
Nation, paper presented at the Political Science Association MPSA National Conference, Apr. 3-6, 
2003, at 7-8, available at http://www.kpi.ac.th/en/meaning_of_democracy1.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 
2004). 
 92. Robert B. Albritton & Thawilwadee Bureekul, Support for Democracy in Thailand, paper 
presented at the annual meeting of The Association for Asian Studies, San Diego, Mar. 4-7, 2004, at 9, 
available at http://www.kpi.ac.th/download/Support%20(English).pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2004). 
021405 PEERENBOOM.DOC 4/26/2005  4:29 PM 
2004] SHOW ME THE MONEY 109 
popular support for the government’s current policies which emphasize 
economic growth and majoritarian concerns even if at the expense of 
individual liberties in some instances.93  Moreover, Thais remain distrustful 
of political parties, while 75% view diversity of political and social views 
as threatening, and 45% are unwilling to tolerate minority viewpoints.94  
Nor is there a very deep commitment to rule of law and separation of 
powers.  A majority would accept government control over the judiciary or 
even parliament to promote the wellbeing of the nation.95 
That some Asian citizens would harbor doubts about the most recent 
wave of democratization is understandable given the disappointing results 
of earlier experiments with democracy in Asia and the lackluster 
performance of many recently democratized states in other parts of the 
world, which has led to a reversion to authoritarianism in several countries.  
Indonesia tried democracy just after independence from the Dutch between 
1950 and 1957.  The experiment ended when Sukarno declared martial law.  
Thailand has gone through numerous cycles of democratic elections 
followed by military-led coups – since 1932, there have been some 
seventeen coups attempts.96  South Korea held elections in the 1960s and 
early 1970s before returning to authoritarian rule.  The less-than-successful 
experiments with democracy in the Philippines from 1935 led to the 
declaration of martial law by Marcos in 1972.  More generally, many third-
wave democracies have failed to generate economic growth or to deliver on 
human rights promises, leading to massive discontent on the part of the 
citizenry, calls to cut back on liberal rights in favor of a harsher law and 
order agenda, and in some cases reversion to authoritarian governments.97 
                                                                                                                                      
 93. Cf. Muntarbhorn, supra note 24 (noting that Thailand's current administration is, in many 
ways, run like a business, leading to conflicts of interest in the protection of human rights). 
 94. Albritton & Bureekul, supra note 92 (however, only 25% agree that free speech is not worth it 
if that means having to put up with a threat of social disorder, while over 90% believe that the political 
leaders should tolerate views of challengers, suggesting that Thais are aware of the misuse of 
restrictions on free speech in the name of public order and the use of defamation laws to curtail political 
opposition). 
 95. Id.   
 96. CHRISTIE & ROY, supra note 58, at 161. 
 97. Between 1996 and 2000, only 27 to 37% of Latin Americans expressed satisfaction with 
democracy.  See Chu et al., supra note 82, at 129.  Support for democracy in 2002 was lower than in 
1996  in all but four countries.  According to the LATINOBAROMETER, supra note 87, Latin Americans 
have lost confidence in democracy because of the lack of economic growth, the deterioration of public 
services, the rise of crime, and the persistence of widespread corruption.  As a result, there is little trust 
in democratic institutions, including political parties (19%), parliaments (22%), and the judiciary 
(26%).  Nevertheless, Latin Americans are reluctant to return to the recent past of authoritarian military 
regimes.  Only in Paraguay do the majority believe authoritarian government to be preferable to 
democracy.  In contrast, several authoritarian regimes in Asia have been successful in providing growth, 
improving public services, ensuring stability, and curtailing corruption.  Thus, whereas Latin Americans 
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Although democracy may be messy everywhere, recent elections in 
Asia have been particularly disheartening.  The presidential elections in 
Indonesia featured two former military men, who collectively received 
more than a majority of the vote in the preliminary run-off.  One of them, 
General Wiranto, the head of Suharto’s former Golkar Party, is accused of 
being a war criminal for attacks on civilians in East Timor.98  Far from 
being disqualifying, the accusations seem to have caused some Indonesians 
to support the General in a show of nationalist resistance to foreign 
pressure and criticism.  In the final round, former General Susilo Bambang 
Yodhoyono won in a landslide over Megawati. 
In India, the voters threw out a regime despite a growth rate of 8%, 
opting instead for the Congress Party, led by the Italian born Sonia Ghandi, 
widow of the assassinated former Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi – who then 
promptly decided not to take office.  The turmoil caused the single biggest 
one-day drop in the stock markets ever, although the markets recovered 
when Ghandi named an economist known for his market-orientation to 
head her party.99  The elections - marred by the deaths of over 20 women 
and children in a stampede to secure sarees, boycotts of the polls in 
Kashmir by separatist militants and a bomb that killed eleven people 
attending a political rally, the murder of 26 policemen by Maoist guerillas 
in Jharkhand, the shooting deaths of three political party members in Bihar, 
and the usual charges of rampant vote-buying – were described as 
relatively clean and successful by Indian standards.100 
In the Philippines, where former actor Joseph Estrada was impeached 
and forced out of office after being linked to illegal payoffs from gambling 
lords, President Arroyo squared off against another leading film actor, 
Fernando Poe, a high school drop out who had never held public office, 
although he did once play a town mayor in the movies.  Poe studiously 
avoided the issues in a campaign long on symbol and short on substance on 
the part of both candidates.101 
                                                                                                                                      
see no alternative to democracy, many Asians see some form of soft authoritarianism or nonliberal 
democracy as viable options. 
 98. Guido Guillart, Associated Press, UN-Backed Tribunal Issues Arrest Warrant for Former 
Indonesian Army Chief, available at LEXIS, News Library .  
 99. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT EXECUTIVE BRIEFING No. 310, INDIA: GOING, GOING, 
GHANDI  2, (May 18, 2004). 
 100. Asia: The Greatest Show on Earth; India's Election, ECONOMIST, April 17, 2004, at 58 
(describing the ills besetting Indian politics as: "not just of constituencies handed down like family 
heirlooms; but also of venal, sometimes thuggish and often outright criminal candidates; of parties 
appealing not on the basis of policies but of narrow regional or caste interests; of coalitions formed not 
out of like-minded ideologies but out of naked power-seeking"). 
 101. Marites Danguilan Vitug, Star Power Holds Perils for the Philippines; Celebrity Politics, 
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 20, 2004, at 8. 
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In Taiwan, Chen Shuibian seemed willing to risk confrontation with 
Beijing just to stay in office, continually challenging Beijing and 
Washington with calls for a national referendum and constitutional 
changes, despite stern warnings from Beijing and Washington to avoid 
further provocation.  Even close observers of Taiwanese politics - used to, 
as they are, fisticuffs and chair-throwing by members of the legislature – 
were shocked by the dirty politics in which the KMT compared Chen to 
Hitler, and then the bizarre shooting of the president and vice-president by 
a slow-moving bullet on the day before elections.102  Capitalizing on the 
sympathy vote from the shooting, Chen claimed victory by less than 30,000 
votes out of a total of 13.3 million.  After weeks of protests and 
demonstrations both peaceful and otherwise by supporters of the LDP, 
Chen was sworn into office, and must now lead a deeply divided public.   
Meanwhile, in South Korea, President Roh was impeached on charges 
of illegal campaigning, corruption among his aides and mismanagement of 
the economy, then acquitted and reinstated.103  However, his subsequent 
attempt to replace several cabinet members without following 
constitutional procedures gave rise to complaints of amateurism and 
unflattering comparisons to the heavy-handed ways of former dictators.104 
The experiences of Asian countries demonstrate that democracy is no 
panacea, and that democratization will not necessarily lead to 
improvements in human rights, resolve ethnic tensions, or ensure economic 
growth and better standards of living.  In some cases, there may be a 
tension between democracy and the protection of rights and other goals.  
The problems with democracy in Asia do not support the conclusion that 
authoritarian regimes would necessarily be preferable. They do suggest, 
however, the possibility that democracy may not be the only or best option 
in all circumstances.  Of course, authoritarian regimes also have their 
problems, and not all have been successful in ensuring economic growth or 
improving citizens’ lives.  Thus much depends on the specific nature of the 
regime.  At minimum, the performance of both democratic and non-
democratic regimes should be scrutinized and evaluated objectively and 
without bias.105  Democracy proponents often argue in the face of poor 
                                                                                                                                      
 102. See Anthony Lawrance, Nobody Said Democracy Is a Tea Party, S. CHINA MORNING POST, 
Mar. 27, 2004, at 13 (recounting the events of the Taiwanese election). 
 103. U.N. Secretary General to Make Congratulatory Call to Roh, YONHAP ENG. NEWS, May 18, 
2004, 2004 WL 79245193. 
 104. Amateurism Impairs Roh Regime, KOREAN TIMES, May 27, 2004, 2004 WL 80168596. 
 105. Amnesty International and State Department reports, which provide much of the data for 
rights indexes, have historically been biased against non-liberal democratic regimes.  To take one 
example, reporting on China, especially by human rights organizations and the mass media, is on the 
whole overwhelmingly negative.  Reports tend to focus on individual civil and political rights cases, 
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economic performance, massive demonstrations, calls for regime change, 
and elections marred by violence and vote-buying, that democracy is 
“messy.”106  However, the same apologists for democracy are quick to 
criticize every shortcoming under an authoritarian regime, to blame the 
problems on the nondemocratic nature of the government and to call for 
immediate elections as a solution.  One can only imagine the scorn that 
would be heaped on anyone so bold as to offer in response to political 
violence, widespread corruption, and other social maladies in authoritarian 
states, the limp excuse that “authoritarianism is messy.” 
D. Culture and Religion 
As critics of Asian values have pointed out, the Asian region clearly 
boasts a wide diversity of religious systems and cultural practices.  The 
wide diversity prevents simplistic conclusions based on stereotypes about 
Confucians or Muslims or Asian communitarians.  Nevertheless, as the 
various surveys cited in this Article show, values continue to affect the 
outcome across a wide range of rights issues. 
Cultural factors would seem to explain in part the relatively greater 
restrictions on free speech and the media in both democratic and 
                                                                                                                                      
often either ignoring or paying short shrift to China's accomplishments in raising living standards, 
improving the legal system, and negotiating the difficult transition to a market economy without major 
chaos.  More generally, discussions of human rights in China frequently lack a comparative framework 
that would put China's record as a lower-middle-income transitional country in perspective.  Despite 
China's overall steady progress across a range of human rights indicators, State Department reports in 
1999, 2000 and 2001 claimed that the human rights situation deteriorated or worsened.  Every year the 
reports have painted a dismal picture, with reports from 1995 to 2004 claiming "widespread" violations, 
and reports from 2002 to 2004 report claiming "numerous" and "serious" abuses.  See Peerenboom, 
supra note 2.   
Although the bias against non-liberal democracies is most obvious in the area of civil and political 
rights, the bias is also evident in discussions of rule of law and good governance.  As noted, China 
outperforms the average in its income class on rule of law and good governance.  Yet mentioning rule 
of law in relation to China often meets with wide-eyed disbelief and derision.  Some knowledgeable 
legal commentators even argue that China lacks a legal system. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 50 
(critiquing claims that China lacks a legal system).  One of the main reasons that China's efforts to 
implement rule of law are so summarily dismissed is that commentators conflate rule of law with liberal 
democracy.  For the same reason, many liberal human rights critics claim that Singapore lacks rule of 
law, even though Singapore's legal system is routinely ranked among the best – if not the best – in the 
world.  The bias against nondemocratic regimes is also evident in the U.S. application of intellectual 
property-related trade sanctions.  Throughout the 1990s and still today, China and Russia have been 
guilty of widespread and roughly comparable intellectual property violations.  Yet while China was 
designated a Priority Foreign Country four times, Russia never made the list. Members of the U.S. 
Congress defended the differential treatment on the ground that the U.S. needed to cut the fledgling 
democracy in Russia some slack.  Peerenboom, supra note 2. 
 106. See, e.g., Lawrance, supra note 102, at 13 (positive voter turnout and election results in 
Taiwan largely forgotten in midst of street protests and commentary alleging that balloting was suspect 
and the election was a fraud). 
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nondemocratic states.107  The restrictions are most apparent in North Korea 
and Myanmar, although Singapore, Malaysia, China and Vietnam are also 
known for tight limits on the press.108  But even the more democratic 
countries in the region keep a short leash on the press and free speech by 
citizens.   
South Korean President Roh has declared that the government will 
take legal action against any news organization that publishes editorials 
containing false information regarding government policy or personnel.  In 
2003, Roh personally brought a libel suit against four major newspapers 
that allegedly defamed him and his family by publishing falsehoods about 
his fund-raising activities and real estate transactions.109   
In Indonesia, after a period of expansive freedom of speech and the 
press during the Habibe and Wahid years, the Megawati government, 
supported by a public increasingly wary of unfettered expression, pushed 
through a law that imposed several restrictions on freedom of expression, 
assembly, and the press.  The former editor of a daily paper was found 
guilty of insulting the chairman of the Golkar party currently serving as 
speaker of legislature, while another editor was prosecuted for insulting 
Megawati.110   
Meanwhile, in Thailand, television and radio stations remain publicly 
owned, and the government has used the leverage gained from licensing 
and advertisements to influence press coverage, resulting in self-censorship 
and the sacking of editors critical of the government.111  Freedom House 
therefore demoted Thailand from “free” to “partly free” status.112   
Despite a liberal press, India continues to prosecute people who 
criticize the judiciary, while libel cases remain common.113  Even in Japan, 
a broad ban on incitement of illegal activities, permit requirements for 
                                                                                                                                      
 107. For polling data, see PEERENBOOM, supra note 50; Welsh, supra note 85; Sim, supra note 85; 
Albritton & Bureekul, supra note 91; Park and Shin, supra note 90. 
 108. See John Gillespie, Evolving Concepts of Human Benefits and Rights in Vietnam, in THE 
RIGHTS OF ASIANS TODAY, supra note 14 (noting that current restrictions reflect in part the realization 
on the part of the ruling regime that free speech and media destabilized the former colonial regime). 
 109. Hahm, supra note 75. 
 110. Juwana, supra note 23. 
 111. Muntarbhorn, supra note 24. 
 112. Asia's Media Have Few Reasons to Celebrate World Press Freedom Day, AGENCE FRANCE 
PRESS, May 2, 2004, available at http://www.worldrevolution.org/article/1293 (last visited Oct. 30, 
2004) (also noting the Philippines was demoted from free to partly free for failure to protect journalists 
and to prosecute those who murder journalists). 
 113. Upendra Baxi, Protection of Human Rights and Production of Human Rightlessness in India, 
in THE RIGHTS OF ASIANS TODAY, supra note 14. 
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demonstrations, and other restrictions allow the government considerable 
room to restrict free speech in the name of public order.114 
Religion also remains a crucial and oftentimes divisive factor in 
several states, leading to broad state powers to restrict religious practice in 
the name of social order and harmony.  Governments in the region are 
extremely wary of the volatile mix of religion and politics. At one extreme, 
Islamic fundamentalism has fueled insurgency and separatist movements in 
Thailand, Indonesia, and China, and raised concerns in multi-ethnic 
Malaysia and Singapore.115  China is also wary of Tibetan Buddhists’ 
support for the Dalai Lama. Religious groups have also fought with each 
other, resulting in bloody conflicts in India, Indonesia, and elsewhere. 
 Countermeasures in these countries have ranged from violent 
repression and the imposition of martial law along with derogation of 
rights, to registration requirements for religious organizations, limits on 
venues of worship, restrictions on or prohibitions of religious education, 
limitations on hate speech or other speech that could incite religious 
conflicts, and banning of the wearing of religious symbols such as veils or 
headscarves in public.116  In China, members of the five official churches 
are allowed to practice without undue restrictions.  However, members of 
unapproved house churches who have sought to unite with the Pope and 
advocated religious-based practices that are at odds with the government 
policies on contraception and abortion have been harassed and 
prosecuted.117  With a regulatory regime much like China’s, Vietnam 
tolerates and even encourages religious practice provided the religion does 
                                                                                                                                      
 114. See Shigenori Matsui, The Protection of Fundamental Rights in Japan, in THE RIGHTS OF 
ASIANS TODAY, supra note 14 (noting that despite constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression, 
political speech and public demonstrations are widely restricted in Japan). 
 115. See Muntarbhorn, supra note 24; Juwana, supra note 23; Peerenboom, supra note 2; Li-ann 
Thio, Taking Rights Seriously? Human Rights in Singapore, in THE RIGHTS OF ASIANS TODAY, supra 
note 14; and H. P. Lee, Human Rights in Malaysia, in THE RIGHTS OF ASIANS TODAY, supra note 14. 
 116. See Thio, supra note 115 (describing measures taken by Singapore, many at the discretion of 
the executive and not subject to judicial review); Muntarbhorn, supra note 24 (discussing the history of 
Southern Thailand and noting that there have been intermittent clashes with security forces there); 
Juwana, supra note 23 (discussing the Indonesian government's role in regulating and promoting 
religion); Peerenboom, supra note 2 (discussing China's implementation of religious restrictions and its 
crackdown on Falun Gong); Carol Evans, Chinese Law and the International Protection of Religious 
Freedom, 44 J. CHURCH & ST. 749, 758 (2002) (noting the legal restrictions placed on the free practice 
of religion in China).  See also, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM'S RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE CONCERNING COUNTRIES 
OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (Feb. 18, 2004) available at http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/29560.htm (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2004) (noting that fatal attacks against the Muslims and Christians led to the killing of more 
than a thousand people in Gujarat, India in 2002). 
 117. U.S DEP'T OF STATE, U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
PRACTICES, CHINA (2004), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27768.htm (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2004). 
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not become a source of opposition to government policies or undermine 
efforts to establish the “Great Unity” of Vietnamese society.118  In 
Singapore, religious leaders who challenge state policies or become 
involved in political issues have run afoul of government policies that try to 
confine religious groups to educational, social and charitable work, rather 
than “radical social action.”119 
Drawing a balance between freedom of religion and political stability 
has proven especially difficult with respect to new religions or cults.  
Aware that religious groups have destabilized dynasties in the past, China 
imposes content-based restrictions on “cults” and “abnormal” religious 
beliefs and practices.120  The crackdown on Falun Gong has received the 
most attention abroad, although the group considers itself a breathing 
exercise group rather than a religion.  The government has justified the ban 
by citing the sect’s increasingly political agenda, organized demonstrations 
including one where more than 10,000 people suddenly surrounded 
Zhongnanhai (the seat of the government), and the deaths of more than 
1600 adherents, including the self-immolation of five people, one of them a 
12-year old girl.121  The government has also outlawed a number of other 
sects, claiming they lack theological training, preach the coming of the 
Apocalypse or Holy War, exploit members for financial gain or commit 
other violations of generally applicable laws such as rape, assault, and tax 
fraud.  Beijing defends the policies by citing similar restrictions on cults in 
other countries, including France and Belgium.122  In the Asian region, 
Japan’s Supreme Court upheld the ban on Aum Shinrikyo after its leaders 
were arrested for releasing poisonous gas in the subway in Tokyo.123  
Singapore has also banned Jehovah Witnesses for refusing to serve in the 
military.124  South Korea, faced with a similar problem, refused to 
recognize Jehovah Witnesses as conscientious objectors.125 
                                                                                                                                      
 118. Gillespie, supra note 108. 
 119. See Thio, supra note 115 (noting that religious freedoms in Singapore are limited by the need 
to preserve harmony and national security). 
 120. See generally MARIA HSIA CHANG: FALUN GONG, THE END OF DAYS (2004) (offering a 
history of religious uprisings in China, and discussing the Chinese government's current conflict with 
Falun Gong); Anne S.Y. Cheung, In Search of a Theory of Cult and Freedom of Religion in China: The 
Case of Falun Gong, 13 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 1, 13-17 (2004) (noting the historical pattern of the 
Chinese government's containment and control of new religious groups); Evans, supra note 116, at 758 
(strong discouragement by the Chinese government of the practice of non-official religions). 
 121. For a more extensive discussion, see PEERENBOOM, supra note 50, at 91-101. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Matsui, supra note 114. 
 124. Thio, supra note 115. 
 125. Hahm, supra note 75. 
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Unfortunately, international law provides little useful guidance in 
distinguishing normal from abnormal religious activities and legitimate 
groups from cults.126  More generally, the potential for religious authority 
to challenge and undermine state authority has led to a wavering and 
incoherent doctrine both internationally and domestically in many countries 
with respect to such issues as separation of church and state, and reasonable 
restrictions on religious practice.127  Within Asia alone, freedom of religion 
exists side by side with state-endorsed atheism in China and Vietnam, and 
Islam as the official state religion in Malaysia.  Meanwhile, in the 
Philippines, Catholicism is privileged in numerous ways, including 
constitutional provisions on abortion and divorce that reflect Catholic 
religious principles;128 in Japan, Shinto remains favored, with courts 
reluctant to hold visits by state leaders to Shinto shrines to be a violation of 
the principle of separation of state and church;129 and in Thailand, 
Buddhism is so dominant as to constitute implicitly the official religion.130 
E. Legal Institutions 
Empirical studies have only begun to explore the relationship between 
legal institutions and the protection of different types of rights.131  While 
promising, this approach is likely to produce indeterminate and inconsistent 
results because of the wide variation among countries on key legal 
institutions and practices such as separation of powers, constitutional 
review, judicial review of executive power, judicial independence, and the 
appointment of judges.  Asian legal systems are no exception, differing 
                                                                                                                                      
 126. PEERENBOOM, supra note 50, at 95-96; Evans, supra note 116, at 762-763.. 
 127. Theo van Boven, Advances and Obstacles in Building Understanding and Respect between 
People of Diverse Religions and Beliefs, 13 HUM. RTS. Q. 437, 442 (1991) (estimating that in the 1980s 
twenty-five regional or civil wars were based to a significant degree on disputes stemming in part from 
religious beliefs). 
 128. Raul Pangalangan, Human Rights in the Philippines, in THE RIGHTS OF ASIANS TODAY, supra 
note 14. 
 129. Matsui, supra note 114. 
 130. See Muntarbhorn, supra note 24 (noting that while Buddhism is not mentioned expressly as 
the state religion in the Thailand Constitution, it is implied). 
 131. See Frank B. Cross, The Relevance of Law in Human Rights Protection, 19(1) INT'L REV. LAW 
& ECON. 87, 93 (1999) (finding that judicial independence is significant with respect to the protection 
of political rights and search and seizure even after controlling for wealth and other factors, but finding 
that federalism and separation of powers were not significant and the presence of constitutional 
provisions regarding search and seizure seem to have no real-world significance); Clair Apodaca, The 
Rule of Law and Human Rights, 87 JUDICATURE 292, 298–99 (2004) (finding that rule of law and 
judicial independence were instrumental in securing both economic and physical integrity rights, 
although rule of law frequently gives way even in rich countries with well-developed legal systems 
during times of international or domestic conflict).  See also Keith and Poe, supra note 20 (examining 
the effect of constitutional constraints on the repression of personal integrity rights). 
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widely in institutions, practices, and conceptions of rule of law.132  
Moreover, legal institutions that function well in one context may produce 
very different outcomes in other contexts. 
What does seem clear from the broad empirical studies as well as the 
experiences of Asian countries to date is that judicial independence is 
generally important if not sufficient for the protection of rights, particularly 
civil and political rights.  The regimes with the least independent courts 
have some of the worst records in protecting civil and political rights, 
including China, Vietnam, Myanmar and North Korea.  On the whole, 
democratization has resulted in increased independence of the courts and a 
more active role in protecting rights, most notably in South Korea, Taiwan 
and Indonesia. 
However, judicial independence alone does not ensure that the courts 
will play an active role in protecting rights.  The level of judicial activism 
varies tremendously in the region.  At one extreme, despite a conception of 
fundamental rights as inherent or the natural rights of all human beings and 
explicit constitutional references to such open-ended notions as 
unenumerated rights and human dignity, Japanese courts have exercised 
their powers of judicial review sparingly in the service of rights, 
interpreting public welfare limitations on rights broadly and generally 
deferring to the legislature.133  Courts in Singapore and Malaysia also 
continue to interpret rights narrowly, relying on a positivist rather than a 
purposive or natural law-based method of interpretation.   
At the other extreme are the Indian, Taiwanese, and Filipino courts.  
The India Supreme Court and the Grand Justices of Taiwan have gone so 
far as to strike down constitutional amendments as unconstitutional.134  In 
the Philippines, the court has aggressively engaged in social and economic 
policymaking by interpreting “directive principles” in the constitution. 
To be sure, activist does not necessarily mean liberal.  In Thailand, the 
courts have shown a conservative inclination to side with entrenched 
interest groups.135  Similarly, although Indian courts have come to the aid 
of the disenfranchised in a variety of ways, the courts remain organs of the 
                                                                                                                                      
 132. See generally ASIAN DISCOURSES, supra note 1 (discussing the differences in rule of law in 
the United States, France, and East Asian countries). 
 133. See Matsui, supra note 114 (discussing the reluctance of Japanese courts in interfering with 
legislative programs). 
 134. Upendra Baxi, Rule of Law in India: Theory and Practice, in ASIAN DISCOURSES, supra note 
1, at 337-38; Tay-sheng Wang, The Legal Development of Taiwan in the 20th Century: Toward a 
Liberal and Democratic Country, 11 PAC.  RIM L. & POL'Y J. 531, 531at n. * (2002). 
 135. Vitit Muntarbhorn, Rule of Law and Aspects of Human Rights in Thailand: From 
Conceptualization to Implementation, in ASIAN DISCOURSES, supra note 1, at 346, 362. 
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state, with judges inclined by personal circumstances and professional 
training toward moderate rather than radical solutions.136 
The aggressiveness of the courts also varies by category of right.  
National laws frequently prohibit or limit judicial review of many national 
security decisions.  But even when judicial review is possible, Asian courts 
have been reluctant to challenge executive and parliamentary decisions 
involving national security.137 
Similarly, the role of courts is limited in China, Vietnam, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Japan, Hong Kong, and South Korea with respect to many 
social and economic rights by the traditional view that such rights are 
generally not justiciable or that they involve resource allocation decisions 
best left to the legislature.  Nevertheless, even where such rights are 
considered nonjusticiable, Asian governments generally have taken 
seriously their obligations to provide the necessary minimal conditions for 
human flourishing, subject to resource constraints largely in line with GDP 
levels, as the empirical studies indicate.  The conceptualization however is 
not so much in terms of rights as traditional paternalistic beliefs that rulers 
are obligated to ensure the material and spiritual wellbeing of the people.  
For instance, in China, the new leadership of Hu and Wen has shown 
sensitivity to issues of social justice, implementing a number of policies to 
ease the hardships of those who have lost out in the transition to a more 
competitive capitalist economic system.  In so doing, they are able to draw 
on a rich tradition of “people as the basis” stretching back to Mencius.  
While such traditions are grounded in a nonliberal paternalistic worldview, 
they nonetheless provide a normative basis for social, economic, cultural, 
and collective rights claims today.138 
                                                                                                                                      
 136. Baxi, supra note 134, at 339 (noting that Indian activists "remain familiar with the meandering 
nature of judicial activism.”  Even as they engage the activist judiciary in the tasks of Indian democratic 
renewal, their politics of hope remains moderated by the acknowledgement of the brute institutional fact 
that courts and justices remain, at the end of the day, state-bound and -permeated beings."); Jamie 
Cassels, Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India: Attempting the Impossible?, 37 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 495, 515 (1989) (warning that India's activist judges have been criticized for violating rule of 
law, and that not all judicial decisions have favored the oppressed and less fortunate). 
 137. For a discussion of physical integrity rights and derogation of rights in times of emergency, 
national security laws, and the effects of the war on terrorism in Asia, see generally THE RIGHTS OF 
ASIANS TODAY, supra note 14. 
 138. Policies, as well as underlying philosophies, in the area of social or welfare rights vary 
considerably from country to country in terms of the required or appropriate role for government. China 
and Vietnam have little problem reconciling broad welfare policies with state socialism.  In contrast, 
Singapore emphasizes the need to avoid welfare dependency while providing individuals the 
opportunities and resources to become self-sustaining, as captured in the slogan: give me a fish, and I 
eat for a day; teach me to fish and I eat for a lifetime.  Nevertheless, the government provides 
subsidized housing, schooling, and medical care.  Hong Kong, despite its commitment to laissez faire 
economic principles, also provides subsidized housing, schooling, and medical care.  See generally Ian 
Holliday, Productivist Welfare Capitalism: Social Policy in East Asia, 48 (4) POL. STUD. 706, 712–13 
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On the other hand, several Asian countries have developed an active 
jurisprudence of economic and social rights, in keeping with a 
redistributive, developmental model of rule of law that emphasizes 
redistribution of wealth and social justice issues domestically, and the right 
of development, debt forgiveness and the obligation of the North/developed 
countries to aid the South/developing countries internationally.139  The 
Indonesian constitution contains a long list of social and economic rights, 
while Indian and Filipino courts have blurred or overcome the distinction 
between justiciable and non-justiciable right through interpretation of 
constitutional references to programmatic goals and directive principles.  
The involvement of the judiciary in these complex social and economic 
policy issues has naturally been controversial, and challenged both in terms 
of the merits of the decisions and in terms of judicial competence and the 
proper role for the courts.140  A particularly pressing issue is whether well-
intentioned reformers who push for the incorporation of such a broad array 
of positive rights in the constitutions of countries at relatively low levels of 
economic development are not setting the government up for failure by 
promising citizens more than the government can possibly deliver.141  In 
India, the Bharatiya Janata Party government was voted out of office 
despite overseeing a period of rapid economic growth.  The vote reflected a 
deep dissatisfaction with growing income disparities and widespread 
poverty amidst the growing wealth of some segments of society.  The 
BJP’s campaign slogan of India Shining only highlighted the discrepancies 
between the haves and the have-nots.  By way of comparison, in wealthy 
South Korea, which has not made social rights justiciable, the government 
only this year made good on its promise to provide an equal education for 
all by providing nine years of compulsory education free of charge.142 
Indonesia offers another cautionary tale.  After the fall of Suharto, 
reformers, flush with optimism, wrote into the Indonesian constitution 
some of the most forward-leaning ideas of the human rights movement.  
                                                                                                                                      
(2000) (providing a discussion of social welfare policy in Hong Kong, Singapore, and other East Asian 
countries). 
 139. Peerenboom, Varieties of Rule of Law, in ASIAN DISCOURSES, supra note 1, at 29-31. 
 140. See, e.g., Raul Pangalangan, The Philippine "People Power" Constitution, Rule of Law, and 
the Limits of Liberal Constitutionalism, in ASIAN DISCOURSES, supra note 1, at 371, 376. 
 141. See, generally, Cass R. Sunstein, Against Positive Rights, in WESTERN RIGHTS?: POST 
COMMUNIST APPLICATION 225 (Adras Sajo ed., 1996); but see Kim Lane Scheppele, A Realpolitik 
Defense of Social Rights, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1921 (2004) (arguing that courts need to support social 
rights, if more in a directive fashion that provides the legislature flexibility in implementation rather 
than by specifying an immediate particular minimum level of entitlement for individuals, because such 
decisions may provide governments the political leverage to resist the harmful prescriptions of 
international financial organizations regarding democratization and marketization). 
 142. Hahm, supra note 75. 
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Accordingly, the constitution now provides that each person has the right to 
physical and spiritual welfare, to have a home, to enjoy a good and healthy 
living environment and to obtain health services.143  Reflecting the 
“capabilities” approach, each person is entitled to assistance and special 
treatment to gain the same opportunities and benefits in the attainment of 
equality and justice.144  The Megawatti government in low-income 
Indonesia has not been able to live up to such broad commitments or even 
to effectively deal with terrorism and rising crime rates.  Realizing that 
writing rights into the constitution does not ensure the resources necessary 
for their implementation, the general populace seems to have become wary 
of the utopian promises of human rights non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) on the one hand, and their constant criticisms of the government 
obviously lacking the means to deliver on such promises on the other.145 
Thailand may be experiencing a similar dynamic.  Now that Thailand 
has democratized, the government is struggling to improve the standards of 
living for citizens.  The ruling party has acted in many ways like a 
traditional Asian government, with a strong executive pushing through 
policies aimed at ensuring economic development and a better standard of 
living for the majority.  As a result, the economy has recovered, and the 
deterioration in quality of life as measured by the UNDP HDI index has 
reversed.  Yet NGOs and rights activists remain critical of government 
policies, pointing out how, notwithstanding considerable progress, 
problems remain with respect to disadvantaged hilltribe peoples and 
socially vulnerable individuals, and how economic development has come 
                                                                                                                                      
 143. 1945 CONST. of the REPUBLIC of INDON. art. 28H(1) (amended 2002), available at 
http://www.indonesianembassy.org.ar/Novedades/constitution1.htm (official) (last visited Oct. 22, 
2004). 
 144. Id. at art. 28H(2). 
 145. See Juwana, supra note 23 (noting that the increase in NGOs and the improvements in 
substantive law have not necessarily resulted in the expansion of human rights).  NGOs face a number 
of challenges in a transitional landscape, including that they will often find themselves in a position of 
criticizing some of the former opposition figures who were their partners and now are government 
leaders.  NGOs may also find it difficult to reconcile their more critical, idealistic approach to rights 
issues with a more pragmatic approach, or be unwilling or unable to modify oppositional tactics to 
accommodate a more cooperative partnership with the new regime.  They may also lose their local 
support base and become perceived as instruments of foreign states and actors out of touch with local 
circumstances.  See Christine Bell and Johanna Keenan, Human Rights Nongovernmental 
Organizations and the Problems of Transition, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 330, 346–47 (2004) (once in power 
even the rights-friendly Mandela criticized NGOs, noting that "many of our nongovernmental 
organizations are not in fact NGO's, both because they have no popular base and the actuality that they 
rely on the domestic and foreign governments, rather than the people, for their material sustenance." 
(quoting from Report by the President of the ANC, Nelson Mandela, to the 50th National Conference of 
the African National Congress, Dec. 17, 1997, available at 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/conf/conference50/presaddress.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2004)). 
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at the expense of transparency and political participation.146  To be sure, the 
Thailand constitution has incorporated broad ideals such as “human 
dignity,” and NGO critics raise legitimate concerns.  But governments in 
middle-income countries such as Thailand will inevitably have difficulty 
living up to such idealistic standards.  The broad public seems more 
tolerant and supportive of the government efforts to address issues within 
the limits of available resources. 
Although judicial independence is generally important to the 
protection of rights, relying on courts alone is clearly not sufficient to 
protect rights adequately.  Courts are limited by political constraints, 
restrictive laws, interpretive traditions and their inability to control 
financial decisions and implement their own decisions.  A variety of other 
institutions have arisen to assist courts in protecting rights, including 
national human rights commissions, ombudsmen and a vast network of 
NGOs. 
Several states have established national human rights commissions, 
including Thailand, Indonesia, India, the Philippines and Sri Lanka.  On the 
whole, the commissions have mixed records.  Many rights advocates were 
skeptical about Malaysia’s human rights commission Sukaham, fearing that 
it would end up serving as a mouthpiece for the government.  Sukaham’s 
inclusion in the foreign ministry, headed by a foreign minister who 
objected to the liberal biases of the human rights movement and argued that 
Malaysia should not be judged based on international conventions, 
suggested that its main purpose was to better defend the government 
against foreign criticism.147  However, the commission has interpreted its 
mandate broadly to include social and economic rights, pushed for 
ratification of international treaties, and issued reports critical of the 
government, including calling for the amendment or repeal of the Internal 
Security Act.  At the same time, Sukuham has been reluctant to take sides 
in Malaysia’s complicated cultural and racial issues.  This selective 
approach may in part reflect the indeterminacy of international human 
rights laws in these areas, and the problems of applying abstract and 
general principles to complex local contexts.  Sukuham may also have been 
acting strategically, however, trying to gain a foothold and build up a 
certain amount of popular support and legitimacy in an environment where 
government support remains equivocal, by avoiding issues that are deeply 
                                                                                                                                      
 146. See Muntarbhorn, supra note 24 (noting that hill tribes have been disadvantaged in the 
education of their children and in their quest for Thai nationality). 
 147. Amanda Whiting, Situating Suhakam: Human Rights Debates and Malaysia's National 
Human Rights Commission, 39(1) STAN. J. INT'L L. 59, 75 (2003). 
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divisive within Malaysian society and likely to upset the majority whose 
support is crucial for the commission’s survival. 
In Indonesia, the human rights commission enjoyed popular support 
during the Suharto era, when the majority was united in opposition to 
Suharto.  However, the commission has been taken less seriously after 
democratization both by the government and the public.148  As in many 
countries, some of the members on the commission tend to be forward-
leaning activists pushing the most liberal interpretation of international 
rights law and the latest UN agenda.  More conservative members of the 
commission have challenged the more liberal positions of the activist 
members.  The resulting ideological conflict has reduced the commission’s 
effectiveness.  The governments, whether of Habibe, Wahid, or Megawati, 
have had their hands full dealing with terrorism, rising Islamic 
fundamentalism, unrest in Aceh, and the usual developmental problems 
faced by a low-income country.  Naturally, they have not welcomed 
criticism from commission members of every shortcoming and lapse from 
the idealistic standards of international covenants.149    
Human rights commissions have experienced conflicts with the courts 
as well as the executive branch and the public.  In the Philippines, the 
Supreme Court ruled in a series of cases that the commission had no power 
to provide remedies, but was limited to conducting investigations and 
issuing reports.  Apart from concerns about inconsistency, the court seemed 
eager to defend its turf and its role in the post-authoritarian polity as the 
main defender of rights and protector of the people.  In Indonesia, the 
human rights commission has been limited in effectiveness because of the 
lack of coordination among the various institutions with some role in 
protecting rights.150 
Regional rights systems have played an instrumental role in 
facilitating the development of rights norms, jurisprudence, and 
implementation, especially in Europe.  Unlike the Americas, Europe and 
Africa, Asia lacks a regional rights system.  One possible explanation is 
that there is a greater diversity of values, political systems and conceptions 
of rights in Asia.  However, a more likely explanation is that Asian 
governments have been reluctant to establish a regional rights body out of 
traditional sovereignty concerns that it is not appropriate for other countries 
or a regional body to intervene in how other countries handle human rights 
                                                                                                                                      
 148. Juwana, supra note 23. 
 149. In Thailand as well, the government has taken steps to rein in the human rights commission 
and human rights NGOs.  See Muntarbhorn, supra note 24 (describing situations where Thailand 
government instruments have restricted the work of human rights organizations). 
 150. Juwana, supra note 23. 
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issues, except in circumstances where there are widespread and systematic 
violations of rights.  In addition, Asian governments have on the whole 
emphasized economic development and political stability.  However, the 
need for a regional entity to promote economic development and 
geopolitical stability is already filled by the increasingly robust ASEAN. 
F. Population Size and Ethnic Diversity 
Larger populations are associated with more rights violations in 
absolute terms and per capita, because there is likely to be greater conflict 
among different interest or ethnic groups and the government may be more 
willing to resort to force to curtail potential threats to social order given the 
larger number of people that would be affected by social chaos.  
Populations run the gamut from China at 1.3 billion to Singapore at 4.1 
million.  The populations of the other countries are: India 1.03 billion, 
United States 288 million, Indonesia 214 million, Japan 127 million, 
Vietnam 79 million, the Philippines 77 million, Thailand 66 million, France 
59 million, South Korea 47 million, Malaysia 23 million, and Hong Kong 7 
million. 
Population does help explain rights performance in some cases, 
particularly for China and India.  First, their huge populations are directly 
tied to quality of life issues as reflected in social and economic measures 
because limited resources are spread thin over large numbers.  Second, as 
elsewhere, population size is also a proxy for ethnic diversity.  Ethnic 
diversity has led to conflicts with the state as some groups push for greater 
independence in both countries.  It has also led to conflicts among ethnic 
groups seeking a larger share of resources and demanding affirmative 
action, preferential tax benefits, and exemptions to generally applicable 
laws and regulations.151  The response in China to such conflicts has 
included both carrots and sticks.  Carrots include the establishment of 
special autonomous zones, affirmative actions policies and the allocation of 
additional resources to stimulate economic growth and alleviate poverty in 
ethnic areas.  Sticks include restrictions on the civil and political rights in 
the name of national security, public order, and social harmony.  Third, the 
sheer size of the population results in a “large” number of violations of 
physical integrity rights and civil and political rights, even though 
proportionally the number is small.  China and India’s low level-4 rating on 
the Political Terror Scale is based on the relatively high absolute number of 
personal integrity rights violations rather than the low per capita figures.  
Fourth, and more substantively, the size of the population makes control 
more difficult, instability more likely, and the expected danger value, 
                                                                                                                                      
 151. See Peerenboom, supra note 2 (detailing the conflicts among ethnic minorities in China). 
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calculated by the multiplying the likelihood of instability by the 
consequences of chaos, higher.  In a country the size of China or India, 
even the most radical anti-government movements and bizarre cults may 
attract a significant number of followers, especially now that Internet has 
eliminated the barrier of communication across distance. 
The degree of ethnic diversity is arguably as important as the mere 
size of the population.152  The ethnic diversity of several Asian countries 
has affected human rights protection both directly, through a variety of 
complicated schemes that balance affirmative action and non-
discrimination, and indirectly, by adding to civil tensions that have resulted 
in harsh crackdowns and limitations on civil and political liberties.  India’s 
constitutional history and the broad powers granted to the government to 
order preventive detention cannot be understood without reference to its’ 
struggle for independence from Britain, the legacy of ethnic-based tensions 
resulting from the attempt to divide the territory into Hindu India and 
Muslim Pakistan, and the continuing pressure of ethnic and religious-based 
secessionist movements and tensions that often erupt into violent clashes.153  
Ethnic diversity has also been invoked to support broad state powers and 
tough national security laws in Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and China, 
while an upsurge in Islamic fundamentalism has led to martial law in parts 
of Indonesia and Thailand. 
Asian countries have adopted a variety of approaches to cultural rights 
in response to ethnic and religious diversity, from a melting pot approach 
that emphasizes assimilation, to a “salad bowl” approach that seeks to 
celebrate different traditions and cultures, to a pragmatic approach that 
steers a middle course and emphasizes social stability and harmony.154  
Some states, including Malaysia and India, have adopted a group-rights 
approach, whereas others, such as Singapore, seek to protect groups by 
protecting the rights of the individuals that make up the group. 
India has opted for the salad bowl approach.  The Indian Constitution 
provides strong protections for religious and cultural minorities.  Problems 
                                                                                                                                      
 152. Steven C. Poe & Scott Walker, Does Cultural Diversity Affect Countries' Respect for Human 
Rights?, 24(1) HUM. RTS. Q. 237, 259–60 (2002) (finding that realization of rights is more difficult in 
ethnically diverse societies, that low to medium diversity appears to be necessary although not 
sufficient for the highest level of civil rights, and that more diversity leads to worse performance with 
respect to political rights, subsistence rights, civil rights, and the social and economic equality of 
women, though the relationships are statistically significant only for civil rights and social and 
economic equality for women). 
 153. Baxi, supra note 113. 
 154. Media's Role in Sealing Social Unity, STRAITS TIMES, Sep. 7, 1998, at 1 (rejecting the melting 
pot and salad bowl metaphors, Prime Minister Goh described Singaporean policy as a mosaic in which 
the different communities form a harmonious whole, with each piece retaining its own colour and 
vibrancy). 
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arise, however, when religious and cultural practices are at odds with 
international rights.  For example, Muslim personal law may disadvantage 
women, while traditional Hindu beliefs discriminate against untouchables.  
In response, the government has adopted a complicated two-track system 
that emphasizes reform to certain Hindu practices system while leaving 
other ethnic and religious issues to be sorted out over time. 
Malaysia has adopted a group-based approach that recognizes Islam as 
the state religion and affords special privileges to the dominant but 
historically economically weak Malay population. Special treatment 
includes electoral laws that ensure Malay control, designation of Malay as 
the national language, prominent displays of Malayan culture in official 
ceremonies and on television programs, and economic policies aimed at 
improving the lot of Malays.  Naturally, the large Chinese minority has 
resented such affirmative action policies.  After the race riots in 1969, the 
government passed an emergency security law that provided police wide 
powers of preventive detention.  The government has also passed laws to 
prohibit speech or actions that would promote feelings of ill-will, enmity, 
hatred, disharmony, or disunity, or which question the special position of 
Malays.155 
In keeping with the rejection of group rights in favor of an individual-
rights approach, Singapore rejects affirmative action based on group 
membership.  The government also seeks to instill a national identity 
without trying to eradicate more particularistic cultural identities, which it 
does not believe possible.  Notwithstanding its commitment to meritocracy, 
the government recognizes the need to protect racial and religious 
minorities.  Accordingly, it has recognized the distinctive cultural and 
economic needs of indigenous Malays, most of whom are Muslim.156 
Religious education is a divisive issue in several states due to the 
potential use of religious education to foster demands for political 
autonomy and independence, greater political representation or a greater 
share of resources.  Accordingly, some states, including Vietnam, China, 
India, and Thailand, impose various restrictions on religious education.  
Singapore allows religious education but requires that students be able to 
meet generally applicable standards in certain basic subjects. 
Bilingual education is another sensitive issue in Asia, as elsewhere.  
While the right to be educated in one’s mother tongue may be central to 
                                                                                                                                      
 155. H. P. Lee, Competing Conceptions of Rule of Law in Malaysia, in ASIAN DISCOURSES, supra 
note 1, at 237- 241. 
 156. See Thio, supra note 115 (noting that the Singaporean Constitution enjoins certain government 
action in order to protect the rights and religion of Malays). 
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one’s cultural identity, failure to speak the language of the majority may 
also limit one’s opportunities for development. 
G. Colonial History 
Every country in the region except Thailand has experienced 
colonialism, often by several different powers, sometimes at the same time.  
Although the results of studies are somewhat inconsistent, on the whole 
they tend to show that a history of British colonialism is associated with 
better human rights protection, whereas Japanese colonialism and French 
colonialism may be associated with worse human rights records.157  It is, 
however, impossible to draw any hard and fast conclusions from the 
colonial experiences of countries in Asia.  In some cases, British 
colonialism has been instrumental in laying the foundations for a rule of 
law compliant legal system.  However, British rule was hardly democratic 
or liberal, and citizens of countries ruled by the British did not enjoy full 
civil and political liberties.  Indeed, the British enacted many illiberal state 
security laws, including Malaysia’s Internal Security Act and Hong Kong’s 
laws on sedition.  Colonial divide-and-rule strategies have also exacerbated 
ethnic tensions and fueled secessionist movements, as colonial powers 
swapped lands and redrew boundaries with little regard for the identity 
needs of particular groups. 
What is clear is that the colonial experience has left a bitter taste in the 
mouths of many Asian citizens, and has made them disinclined to welcome 
what they take to be the hypocritical, self-righteous preaching of former 
Western oppressors who regularly violated the civil and political rights of 
Asians when it was in their political and economic interest to do so.  In the 
eyes of many Asians, the current human rights policies of Western powers 
and the international human rights regime are just one more example of 
power politics, the latest variant in a long history of imperialism and 
hegemony in which the West seeks to impose its way of life on the Rest.158 
                                                                                                                                      
 157. Poe et al., supra note 15 at 306, 310. Cf. Reilly, supra note 6 (finding that British 
colonialization was not statistically significant, although Spanish-Portuguese colonial legacy was 
statistically significant, with French colonial legacy associated with higher repression but not reaching 
statistically significant levels); Shawna E. Sweeney, Global Transformations, National Institutions, and 
Women's Rights: A Cross-National Comparative Analysis, paper presented at the annual meeting of The 
America Political Science Association, Chicago, Sept. 2, 2004, available at 
http://www.apsanet.org/mtgs/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2004). 
 158. See BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Students' Attitudes Toward Human Rights 
Surveyed, May 4, 1999, available at LEXIS, News Library. In a survey of 547 students from thirteen 
universities in China, eighty-two percent claimed that for other countries to initiate anti-China motions 
before the U.N. Commission on Human Rights constituted interference in China's internal affairs; 
seventy-one percent believed that the true aim of the United States and other countries in censuring 
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Although Singapore and Malaysia were most vocal in their criticism 
of the liberal biases and hypocrisies of the Western-dominated human 
rights movement, hostility and suspicion run much deeper throughout the 
region.  China has long argued, with some truth, that it is subject to a 
double standard.159  There is also a strong current of nationalism in China 
that has fed popular discontent with the way China is portrayed in the 
media on rights issues.  
A broader current of nationalism is rising in various countries in the 
region.  In Thailand, anger at the IMF and its role in the Asian financial 
crisis has fanned a general distrust of international institutions, including 
the U.N., as captured in the slogan “the U.N. is not my father.”160  As 
noted, both in Thailand and Indonesia, public support for international 
rights NGOs and domestic rights commissions has weakened.  In South 
Korea, rising nationalism is manifest in a tendency to emphasize the 
“uniqueness” of Korea and Korean people; in the growing assertion of 
sovereignty and independence in foreign relations, particularly with the 
U.S.; and in opposition to the economic offshoots of globalization, such as 
free-trade agreements, the opening of the service sector in education and 
law, and policies to foster increased labor market flexibility.  Ironically, all 
of these demands for more nationalistic policy may be articulated in terms 
of human rights.161  Independence in foreign policy is the natural extension 
of a national right to self-determination; opposition to trade liberalization is 
supported by the need to protect the subsistence rights of local farmers and 
manufacturers; and the adoption of global labor standards arguably must be 
opposed to safeguard the rights of Korean workers.  Cloaking local 
concerns in the diverse language of human rights provides local activists 
some leverage in their struggles with international NGOs.  International 
NGOs, which are highly critical of North Korea, have also clashed with 
domestic rights groups who favor reconciliation with North Korea. 
Local opposition to universal human rights is not limited to Asia.  
Western countries as well have struggled over how best to reconcile a 
commitment to universal principles with the complex reality of local 
contingencies.  However, at least for economically advanced Western 
liberal democracies, the norms reflected in the international human rights 
corpus are largely consistent with, and indeed the outgrowth of, their own 
values and experiences.  As politically stable consolidated democracies, 
                                                                                                                                      
China was to use the human rights issue to attack China and impose sanctions on it, with sixty-nine 
percent maintaining that this constituted a form of power politics. Id. 
 159. See generally Peerenboom, supra note 2. 
 160. Muntarbhorn, supra note 24. 
 161. Hahm, supra note 75. 
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they do not face the same pressures as many Asian states that are still 
struggling to consolidate democracy or to ensure political stability in the 
face of separatist movements and other threats.  As wealthy countries, they 
also have the resources to establish institutions capable of implementing 
rule of law, and, were they so inclined, to make good on the promises of 
social and economic rights.  The “Asian values” movement in part was an 
attempt for geopolitically weaker Asian states to forge a common basis so 
that Asian countries could demand the same kind of margin of appreciation 
on human rights issues as extended to Western countries.162  At the heart of 
the argument was the claim that the interpretation and implementation of 
rights does and should depend to some degree on local circumstances, 
including not just values, but levels of economic development; political 
institutions and beliefs; legal institutions, doctrines and practices; ethnic 
diversity; the presence of terrorists and other such factors. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Asian countries vary widely in their rights performances generally, on 
specific rights issues, and in the factors that influence the protection of 
rights and the outcomes of specific cases.  The level of economic 
development is clearly a, and usually the most, significant factor.  While 
money may not be able to buy happiness, it does seem to buy a longer life, 
better education, more health care, and even civil and political rights.  The 
nature of the political regime is also important, but economics come first, 
especially at low levels.  Given the importance of wealth to rights 
performance, comparisons are best made between countries in the same 
income categories. 
What then does this overview tell us about values in Asia?  Asia is 
obviously a big place, with tremendous diversity that makes it impossible 
to identify a singular set of “Asian values” shared by everyone in Asia.  On 
the other hand, a pluralism of Asian values is still Asian values.  There is 
nothing inherently contradictory in noting a diversity of values and still 
claiming that they are Asian.  Nor need each country within Asia share 
every single feature.  There may still be dominant patterns within Asia.  
The “West” and “liberalism” also encompass a tremendous diversity of 
views.  Nevertheless, there are still dominant trends in Western thought.  
“Liberalism” clearly has a stronger hold than “communitarianism” in the 
West, for example, whereas the opposite seems to be true in much of Asia, 
although perhaps collectivism is a more apt description than 
communitarianism. 
                                                                                                                                      
 162. See Beyond Universalism and Relativism, supra note 1, at 64-70. 
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Asian values are by definition the dominant values that exist in Asia.  
They form a value cluster with hierarchies and intensities that allow them 
to be compared to other value clusters.  The individual values that make up 
the cluster do not have to be unique to Asia, provided the cluster of values 
as a whole, including the relative ranking and weighting of values within 
the cluster, is distinguishable from the value clusters of other regions.  Nor 
do Asian values have to be shared by all people within Asia or exist to the 
same degree or intensity or be ranked in the same order in all Asian 
countries, provided however that if there are no statistically significant 
shared values between a country and the region at large then the country 
should be identified as an outlier.  There is obvious variation within 
countries/cultures, so some people will have values that are in the minority 
in their own society but perhaps dominant in others.  Nor does it matter that 
the current distribution of values is due more to factors such as economic 
growth or demographic factors like higher rural-urban ratios rather than 
“cultural” explanations such as philosophical traditions or religious beliefs.  
Nor is it the case that the current distribution will forever remain the same.  
For the moment, however, the distribution is what it is, whatever the 
various causes. 
Whether focusing on regions, countries, subnational units or 
individuals is useful depends on one’s project.  Any comparative project 
must begin by constructing categories that highlight certain features and 
thus simplify to some extent quotidian reality.  The problem has not been 
that the East and West, Asian values and Western values are constructs, but 
that they have been overly simple constructs that lacked a firm empirical 
foundation.  On the other hand, the shortcoming of the many multiple-
country studies that find greater “collectivism” and acceptance of hierarchy 
in Asia is not that they fail to identify real differences along the 
individualism versus collectivism or hierarchy versus egalitarianism 
continuums.  Rather, the problem is that individualism versus collectivism, 
and hierarchy versus egalitarianism, are often underdetermining in 
predicting the outcomes on many specific issues.  Accordingly, the broad 
studies are less useful in demonstrating the effects of such differences on a 
range of specific issues and in sorting out the interplay of cultural factors 
and other factors in explaining differences in outcomes.  For that, we need 
more detailed studies.163 
                                                                                                                                      
 163. An excellent example of one such study is AUSTRALIA IN ASIA: COMPARING CULTURES 
(Anthony Milner & Mary Quilty eds., 1996).  Focusing on a variety of practical issues, the various 
chapters repeatedly demonstrate four points.  First, there is significant diversity within Asia.  Second, 
the contrast between liberal emphasis on the individual and the emphasis on the collective cuts across 
many issues from business ethics to human rights, conceptions of democracy, labor relations, national 
security, the media, citizenship, and governance.  See, e.g., id. at 11 ("The liberal ideological package—
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This empirical overview suggests that there are some general patterns 
on a range of specific issues, and that values are one of the important 
factors in determining the outcomes, although not the most determinative 
overall.  One can see a family of resemblances across a range of issues, 
especially in East Asian countries: in the higher priority assigned to social 
stability and economic development over civil and political rights; in the 
greater willingness to accept limits on free speech; in the emphasis on 
education and the use of education to promote national goals;164 in the 
superior performance on good governance measures relative to other 
countries at similar income levels; in the relatively successful efforts to 
maintain social order and fight crime; in the opposition to Western 
colonialism and emergence of a strong nationalist discourse or the attempts 
to interpret human rights principles in terms of local values and 
circumstances.  To be sure, there clearly has been and will continue to be 
change within the region largely due to greater wealth, urbanization and 
modernization.  Nevertheless, core values continue to persist, and Asian 
countries and the Asian region as a whole continue to exhibit relative 
differences with other countries and regions on dimensions such as 
individualism versus collectivism and hierarchy versus egalitarianism, even 
controlling for wealth.  Accordingly, we are likely to see signs of 
convergence and divergence on human rights issues in the future, both 
interregionally and intraregionally. 
The Asian values debate has often been carried on at an excessively 
abstract level by advocates of universal human rights and those who 
question just how universal rights are.  The former have argued that there is 
an expansive over-lapping consensus regarding human rights as 
demonstrated by ratification of rights covenants.  In response, critics argue 
that the hard core of universal rights is extremely limited, and that 
ratification of rights covenants does not demonstrate a thick consensus on 
specific issues.  Although there are many rights that people agree are 
desirable when stated at very high level of abstraction, agreement at such a 
lofty level is not helpful in resolving most pressing social issues.  The 
broad empirical studies are too general to shed much light on these debates.  
                                                                                                                                      
a tradition of debate, freedom and individualism, a stress on equality, and abhorrence of a too vigorous 
official nationalism—seems to be more, not less, influential when Australia is contrasted with Asian 
countries.").  Third, the greater emphasis on collectivism does not preclude diversity in any of these 
areas as a result of differences in geography, population, language, religion, cultural narratives, and 
level of economic development.  Fourth, while some convergence with Western liberal democracies is 
to be expected as Asian countries modernize, the factors just mentioned will also lead to significant and 
persisting divergence. 
 164. Id. at 98 (noting differences in such fundamental matters as the authority of the teacher and the 
process by which knowledge is transferred from teacher to student). 
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More detailed studies of particular cases are necessary to determine the 
degree of commonality and diversity. 
Analysis of particular cases in various Asian countries demonstrates 
that there are differences both in terms of legal rules and outcomes in 
similar cases even when the laws are similar.165  For instance, all countries 
advocate freedom of religion.  Yet Malaysia and Singapore, two ethnically 
diverse states often linked together as advocates of Asian values, differ 
significantly in their approach to religious freedom and minority rights.  
Although they face similar problems and share a common concern for 
social stability and religious harmony, Malaysia and Singapore have 
reached different outcomes on similar cases.  Similarly, defamation laws 
vary widely within Asia, despite a general commitment to freedom of 
speech. 
While wealth explains much of the variation within Asia and 
elsewhere, the outcomes in specific cases are often driven by complex 
patterns of generally applicable and locally specific variables.  Broad 
similarities in doctrine and principles are juxtaposed with subtle differences 
in local circumstances that shape outcomes in particular cases and bring to 
the forefront certain issues rather than others within a particular category of 
rights.  As a result, what may seem like a pragmatic or overlapping 
consensus quickly breaks down once one moves beyond discussions about 
the desirability of the broad wish list of rights contained in human rights 
documents to the difficult issues of the justifications for such rights and 
how they are interpreted and implemented in actual cases. 
Whether one focuses on regional, country or subnational studies, the 
results are worrisome for advocates of universal human rights.  Supporters 
of universal human rights have sought to discredit the notion of Asian 
values by pointing to the tremendous diversity within the region.  However, 
if such diversity precludes the possibility of common values within the 
Asian region, then it also precludes a fortiori the possibility of universal 
values.166  Alternatively, one could claim that there are common values 
within the Asian region but they are not distinctive.  However, what 
common values do exist are so abstract and so thin that they lead to widely 
                                                                                                                                      
 165. See generally, THE RIGHTS OF ASIANS TODAY, supra note 14. 
 166. Because "Asian values" has been tainted from misuse by politically oppressive regimes, one 
common suggestion is to replace it with "values in Asia."  This change has the salutary effect of 
signaling a desire to move away from the overtly political use of the term toward a more sophisticated 
approach sensitive to the pluralism within Asia.  But eliminating references to "Asian values" and 
replacing it with "values in Asia" will not put an end to substantive debates about the universality of 
rights or shed any light whatsoever on how rights are to be interpreted or implemented in particular 
contexts in Asia.  At best, it simply shifts the focus to a less grand level, whether that be country by 
country, area of law by area of law, or issue by issue. 
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divergent outcomes on specific issues, many of which are not consistent 
with current human standards as interpreted by the ICCPR human rights 
committee and liberal rights activists.  Both the regional studies and more 
specific country studies cited herein suggest that the secular liberalism that 
provides the thicker ideological basis for the human rights movement today 
is not widely accepted within Asian countries. 
Drawing sufficiently detailed policy implications from this study is 
complicated.  Economic growth, rule of law, social and political stability, 
and – at least at moderate to high income levels – democracy, are generally 
desirable and associated with better rights performance, all else being 
equal.  Nevertheless, none of them individually nor all of them collectively 
guarantee realization of all types of rights across the board.  Clearly what 
works in one context may not work in another.  Given the wide variation in 
legal institutions and other factors that influence rights performance, the 
international human rights community should be wary of one-size-fits-all 
solutions.  In light of the diversity of values within Asia and in comparison 
to other countries and regions, Asian countries should enjoy a “margin of 
appreciation” like that provided European countries by the European Court 
of Human Rights.  Acknowledging the diversity on moral issues within 
Europe, the ECHR has tolerated differences in outcomes particularly in 
cases involving national security, sex, sexual orientation and religion. 
The results of this study suggest that a wide margin of appreciation 
should be extended to three other areas.  The first is free speech, 
specifically speech that incites hatred or exacerbates ethnic tensions.  
Defamation and criticism of the government is another area where legal 
standards and practice vary.  However, the abuse of defamation laws to 
harass political opponents militates against broad deference to governments 
in this area.  
Secondly, given the indeterminacy of international law and the vastly 
different circumstances of particular countries in terms of ethnic and 
religious diversity, countries should be allowed a wide margin of 
appreciation in deciding how best to ensure cultural rights, including issues 
of freedom of religion such as what constitutes abnormal and normal 
practices or legitimate groups as opposed to cults.   
Thirdly, given the disparities in the levels of wealth and the potentially 
destabilizing effect of promising more than the government can deliver, 
states should be allowed considerable discretion in the area of social and 
economic rights. 
Finally, there should be a general appreciation that civil and political 
rights are a function of wealth, war and other circumstances, and that the 
majority of citizens in different countries may very well decide to draw a 
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different balance between the rights of individuals and collective interests 
in this area.  Recognition of such differences need not lead to an express 
doctrine of deference to government decisions to limit rights in the name of 
public order, but rather might lead to a more open-minded, careful scrutiny 
of the context-specific factors that allegedly justify the restrictions in the 
particular case. 
At minimum, every attempt should be made to involve groups with 
knowledge of the local circumstances in identifying areas for change and in 
devising feasible plans for furthering the realization of rights and the lofty 
goals contained in international rights documents.  Perhaps most 
fundamentally, more attention should be paid to economic development 
and poverty reduction because of the devastating effects of poverty and the 
importance of economic development to the realization of all categories of 
rights.  However, acknowledging the importance and desirability of 
fostering economic development still leaves unanswered the many practical 
issues about how best to achieve economic growth within a particular 
country or region. 
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Table 1.1 
Poverty Index 
 
Human  
Poverty Index  
(HPI-1) 
Population Below Income 
 Poverty Line  
(%) 
Country and  
Human  
Development  
Indicator Rank Rank Value (%) 
$1 a day 
1990-
2001 
$2 a day 
1990-
2001 
National 
Poverty 
Line 
1987-
2000 
HPI-1 
rank 
 minus 
income 
poverty 
rank 
26 Hong Kong (HI) .. .. .. .. .. .. 
30 South Korea (UM) .. .. <2 <2 .. .. 
58 Malaysia (M) .. .. <2 9.3 .. .. 
43 Chile (UM) 3 4.1 <2 8.7 17.0 1 
28 Singapore (HI) 6 6.3 .. .. .. .. 
65 Brazil (UM) 18 11.4 9.9 23.7 .. -8 
74 Thailand (M) 24 12.9 <2 32.5 13.1 16 
104 China (LM) 26 14.2 16.1 47.3 4.6 -13 
85 Philippines (LM) 28 14.8 14.6 46.4 36.8 -6 
106 Iran (LM) 31 16.4 <2 7.3 .. 21 
112 Indonesia (LI) 33 17.9 7.2 55.4 27.1 7 
109 Vietnam (LI) 39 19.9 17.7 63.7 .. -4 
121 Nicaragua (LI) 44 24.3 82.3 94.5 47.9 -34 
120 Egypt (LM) 47 30.5 3.1 43.9 16.7 20 
111 South Africa (UM) 49 31.7 <2 14.5 .. 34 
127 India (LI) 53 33.1 34.7 79.9 28. -9 
59 Tanzania (LI) 59 36.2 19.9 59.7 41.6 6 
145 Zimbabwe (LI) 90 52.0 36.0 64.2 34.9 14 
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Table 2.1 
Infant Mortality, Life Expectancy, and Primary School Enrollment 
 
Infant mortality rate 
(per 1,000 live births) 
2001 
Life expectancy at birth 
(years) 
2001 
Net Primary School 
 Enrollment Rate 
(% eligible age children) 
2001 
Hong Kong (HI) 3 Japan (HI) 81.3 Japan (HI) 100 
Japan (HI) 3 Hong Kong (HI) 79.7 France (HI) 100 
Singapore (HI) 3 France (HI) 78.7 Hong Kong (HI) 99 
France (HI) 4 Singapore (HI) 77.8 Taiwan (UM) 99 
South Korea (UM) 5 United States (HI) 76.9 South Korea (UM) 99 
Taiwan (UM) 6 Chile 75.8 Poland (UM) 98 
United States (HI) 7 Taiwan (UM) 75.6 Malaysia (M) 98 
Poland (UM) 8 South Korea (UM) 75.2 Brazil (UM) 97 
Malaysia (M) 8 Poland (UM) 73.6 United States (HI) 95 
Chile (UM) 10 Malaysia (M) 72.8 Vietnam (LI) 95 
Romania (LM) 19 China (LM) 70.6 Singapore (HI) 94 
Thailand (M) 24 Romania (LM) 70.5 Romania (LM) 93 
Philippines (LM) 29 Iran (LM) 69.8 Philippines (LM) 93 
Vietnam (LI) 30 Philippines (LM) 69.5 China (LM) 93 
Brazil 31 Nicaragua (LI) 69.1 Egypt (LM) 93 
China (LM) 31 Thailand (M) 68.9 Indonesia (LI) 92 
Indonesia (LI) 33 Vietnam (LI) 68.6 Chile (UM) 89 
Iran (LM) 35 Egypt (LM) 68.3 South Africa (UM) 89 
Egypt (LM) 35 Brazil (UM) 67.8 India (LI) 86 
Nicaragua (LI) 36 Indonesia (LI) 66.2 Thailand (M) 85 
South Africa (UM) 56 India (LI) 63.3 Nicaragua (LI) 81 
India (LI) 67 South Africa (UM) 50.9 Zimbabwe (LI) 80 
Zimbabwe (LI) 76 Tanzania (LI) 44 Iran (LM) 74 
Tanzania (LI) 104 Zimbabwe (LI) 35.4 Tanzania (LI) 47 
021405 PEERENBOOM.DOC 4/26/2005  4:29 PM 
2004] SHOW ME THE MONEY 139 
Table 3.1 
Public Spending Priorities (% GDP) 
 
Public  
Expenditure on  
Education 
Public  
Expenditure on 
Health 
Military  
Expenditure 
Country and Human  
Development Indicator Rank 
1998-2000 2000 2001 
145 Zimbabwe (LI) 10.4 3.1 3.2 
58 Malaysia (M) 6.2 1.5 2.2 
17 France (HI) 5.8 7.2 2.5 
111 South Africa (UM) 5.5 3.7 1.6 
29 Taiwan (UM) 5.5 0.4 1.5 
74 Thailand (M) 5.4 2.1 1.4 
35 Poland (UM) 5.0 4.2 1.9 
121 Nicaragua (LI) 5.0 2.3 1.1 
26 Hong Kong 4.9* 1.6 .. 
7 United States (HI) 4.8 5.8 3.1 
65 Brazil (UM) 4.7 3.4 1.5 
106 Iran (LM) 4.4 2.5 4.8 
43 Chile (UM) 4.2 3.1 2.9 
85 Philippines (LM) 4.2 1.6 1.0 
127 India (LI) 4.1 0.9 2.5 
30 South Korea (UM) 3.8 2.6 2.8 
120 Egypt (LM) 3.7 1.8 2.6 
28 Singapore (HI) 3.7 1.2 5.0 
9 Japan (HI) 3.5 6.0 1.0 
72 Romania (LM) 3.5 1.9 2.5 
160 Tanzania (LI) 2.1 2.8 1.3 
104 China (LM) 2.1 1.9 2.3 
112 Indonesia (LI) 1.0 0.6 1.1 
109 Vietnam (LI) .. 1.3 7.9 
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Table 4.1 
Income Inequality 
 
Share of Income or 
Consumption (%) 
Richest 20% 
to  
Poorest 20% 
Gini 
 Index (%) 
1990-2001 1990-2001 1990-2001 
Country and Human  
Development Indicator 
Rank 
Poorest 20% Richest 20%   
9 Japan (HI) 10.6 35.7 3.4 24.9 
72 Romania (LM) 8.2 38.4 4.7 30.3 
112 Indonesia (LI) 8.4 43.3 5.2 30.3 
30 South Korea (UM) 7.9 37.5 4.7 31.6 
35 Poland (UM) 7.8 39.7 5.1 31.6 
17 France (HI) 7.2 40.2 5.6 32.7 
29 Taiwan (UM) 6.7 41.1 6.2 34.5 
120 Egypt (LM) 8.6 43.6 5.1 34.4 
109 Vietnam (LI) 8.0 44.5 5.6 36.1 
127 India (LI) 8.1 46.1 5.7 37.8 
160 Tanzania (LI) 6.8 45.5 6.7 38.2 
104 China (LM) 5.9 46.6 8.0 40.3 
7 United States (HI) 5.2 46.4 9.0 40.8 
28 Singapore (HI) 5.0 49.0 9.7 42.5 
106 Iran (LM) 5.1 49.9 9.7 43.0 
74 Thailand (M) 6.1 50.0 8.3 43.2 
26 Hong Kong (HI) 5.3 50.7 9.7 43.4 
85 Philippines (LM) 5.4 52.3 9.7 46.1 
58 Malaysia (M) 4.4 54.3 12.4 49.2 
145 Zimbabwe (LI) 4.6 55.7 12.0 56.8 
43 Chile (UM) 3.2 61.3 19.3 57.5 
111 South Africa (UM) 2.0 66.5 33.6 59.3 
121 Nicaragua (LI) 2.3 63.6 27.9 60.3 
65 Brazil (UM) 2.2 64.1 29.7 60.7 
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Table 5.1 
Regional Governance Indicators (2002 percentile rank) 
 
Region and Human  
Development Indicator Rank V
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OECD 91.3 87.2 91.6 91.9 91.6 91.3 
Eastern Europe 65.0 60.5 57.7 63.2 56.5 54.7 
Latin American  
and Caribbean 
61.2 51.2 53.3 58.4 53.2 54.9 
East Asia 50.3 54.6 50.5 42.8 47.5 44.4 
Middle East and North Africa 28.6 40.1 49.9 44.9 54.2 54.7 
South Asia 29.6 32.4 48.1 35.3 42.1 41.5 
Sub-Saharan Africa 31.0 34.8 28.9 30.6 30.5 32.4 
Former Soviet Union 22.7 31.1 21.7 25.4 20.4 16.8 
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Table 6.1 
Quality of Governance (Percentile Rank, 2002) 
 
Country and Human 
Development Indicator Rank 
V
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7 United States (HI) 90.9 56.2 91.2 91.2 91.8 92.3 
9 Japan (HI) 79.3 90.3 84.5 78.9 88.7 85.1 
17 France (HI) 88.4 70.8 90.7 85.6 87.6 89.2 
26 Hong Kong (HI) 53.5 85.4 88.7 90.7 86.6 90.2 
28 Singapore (HI) 65.7 91.9 100.0 99.5 93.3 99.5 
29 Taiwan (UM) 74.2 70.3 82.5 80.9 80.9 77.3 
30 South Korea (UM) 67.7 60.5 79.4 76.3 77.8 66.5 
35 Poland (UM) 83.3 69.7 71.1 71.1 70.6 69.1 
43 Chile (UM) 84.3 85.9 90.2 90.2 87.1 90.7 
58 Malaysia (M) 42.4 61.6 68.6 68.6 69.6 68.0 
65 Brazil (UM) 58.1 48.1 63.4 63.4 50.0 56.7 
74 Thailand (M) 57.1 62.7 65.5 65.5 62.4 53.6 
72 Romania (LM) 61.1 58.4 55.7 55.7 54.1 45.4 
85 Philippines (LM) 54.0 29.7 57.7 57.7 38.1 37.6 
104 China (LM) 10.1 51.4 40.2 40.2 51.5 42.3 
106 Iran (LM) 18.2 25.9 8.2 8.2 33.5 44.3 
109 Vietnam (LI) 10.6 61.1 25.3 25.3 44.8 33.0 
111 South Africa (UM) 70.7 42.7 69.1 69.1 59.8 67.5 
112 Indonesia (LI) 34.8 12.4 34.0 26.3 23.2 6.7 
127 India (LI) 60.6 22.2 54.1 43.8 57.2 49.5 
120 Egypt (LM) 22.2 34.1 46.9 38.1 57.7 47.9 
121 Nicaragua (LI) 52.0 47.6 17.5 39.7 32.0 39.7 
145 Zimbabwe (LI) 7.1 8.6 22.2 4.1 5.7 6.2 
160 Tanzania (LI) 37.9 35.7 36.1 33.5 38.7 15.5 
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Table 7.1 
Crime Statistics (rate per 100,000) 1997-2002 
 
Country and Human 
Development Indicator Rank Total Crime Murder Rape 
7 United States (HI) 4160.51 5.61 31.77 
9 Japan (HI) 2300.77 1.1 1.85 
17 France (HI) 6932.26 4.07 17.63 
26 Hong Kong (HI) 1085.64 1.03 1.41 
28 Singapore (HI) 703.84 0.8 2.81 
29 Taiwan (UM) 2179.03 5.13 10.16 
30 South Korea (UM) 1664.06 2.18 4.29 
35 Poland (UM) 3634.84 3.15 6.09 
43 Chile (UM) 1496.92 4.54 9.97 
58 Malaysia (M) 729.71 2.1 5.78 
65 Brazil (UM) 927.41 22.98 8.5 
72 Romania (LM) 2207.05 7.44 8.34 
74 Thailand (M) 245.53 8.07 6.17 
85 Philippines (LM) - 7.85 4.21 
104 China (LM) 133.82 2.16 - 
106 Iran (LM) - - - 
109 Vietnam (LI) 83.56 1.08 - 
111 South Africa (UM) 8176.04 114.84 121.13 
112 Indonesia (LI) 63.48 0.8 0.73 
120 Egypt (LM) - - - 
121 Nicaragua (LI) 1372.27 24.03 26.03 
127 India (LI) 671.2 3.93 1.6 
145 Zimbabwe (LI) 6560.61 10.15 38.38 
160 Tanzania (LI) 1647.98 7.95 10.05 
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Table 7.1 cont. 
Crime Statistics (rate per 100,000) 1997-2002 
 
Country and Human 
Development Indicator Rank Theft Drug Offense Incarceration 
7 United States (HI) 3804.58 539.92 701 
9 Japan (HI) 1871.13 21.68 54 
17 France (HI) 4224.57 182.19 93 
26 Hong Kong (HI) 623.16 36.77 184 
28 Singapore (HI) 415.5 85.08 388 
29 Taiwan (UM) 1473.03 111.13 250 
30 South Korea (UM) 386.31 8.97 125 
35 Poland (UM) 1727.46 93.65 211 
43 Chile (UM) 705.66 16.68 204 
58 Malaysia (M) 581.43 78.95 161 
65 Brazil (UM) - 46.29 160 
72 Romania (LM) 1028.33 2.04 199 
74 Thailand (M) 90 438.13 401 
85 Philippines (LM) 10.21 14.53 94 
104 China (LM) 87.75 3.92 184 
106 Iran (LM) - - 226 
109 Vietnam (LI) 31.41 11.26 71 
111 South Africa (UM) 3565.81 111.85 402 
112 Indonesia (LI) 45.26 3.77 38 
120 Egypt (LM) - - 121 
121 Nicaragua (LI) 579.97 22.79 143 
127 India (LI) 44.01 2.25 29 
145 Zimbabwe (LI) 1958.11 57.03 160 
160 Tanzania (LI) 194.11 13.39 120 
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Table 8.1 
Social Order:  Divorce Rates, Suicide Rates, Young Mothers 
 
Divorce Rate 
(per 1,000) 
Suicide Rates 
(per 100,000) 
Country and Human Development 
Indicator Rank 
1996-2000 1991-2002 
Births by Mothers 
Between Age  
15-19 
(per 1000 
population 1995-
2000) 
7 United States (HI) 4.19 10.85 9.14 
9 Japan (HI) 1.98 25.3 0.70 
17 France (HI) 1.98 17.75 1.58 
26 Hong Kong (HI) 1.95 13.25 1.08 
28 Singapore (HI) 1.20 9.45 1.07 
29 Taiwan (UM) - 13.59 0.50 
30 South Korea (UM) 2.52 13.55 0.63 
35 Poland (UM) 1.09 15.4 4.12 
43 Chile (UM) 0.42 5.8 10.19 
58 Malaysia (M) - - 4.06 
65 Brazil (UM) 0.60 4.2 19.05 
72 Romania (LM) 1.40 12.35 7.93 
74 Thailand (M) - 4 12.41 
85 Philippines (LM) - 2.1 11.80 
104 China (LM) - 13.9 0.97 
106 Iran (LM) 0.81 0.2 13.86 
109 Vietnam (LI) - - 6.52 
111 South Africa (UM) 0.83 - 21.34 
112 Indonesia (LI) - - 15.10 
120 Egypt (LM) 1.17 0.05 14.36 
121 Nicaragua (LI) - 3.45 45.06 
127 India (LI) - 10.65 12.52 
145 Zimbabwe (LI) - 7.9 31.34 
160 Tanzania (LI) - - 39.37 
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Table 9.1 
GDP with and without Purchase Price Parity Adjustment, 2001 
 
Country and Human  
Development Indicator Rank 
GDP 
(US$  
billions) 
GDP 
(PPP US$ 
billions) 
GDP per 
Capita 
(US$) 
GDP per 
Capita 
(PPP US$) 
7 United States (HI) 10,065.3 9,792.5 35,277 34,230 
9 Japan (HI) 4,141.4 3,193.0 32,601 25,130 
26 Hong Kong (HI) 161.9 167.1 24,074 24,850 
17 France (HI) 1,309.8 1,4020.0 22,129 23,990 
28 Singapore (HI) 85.6 93.7 20,733 22,680 
29 Taiwan (UM) 281.2 401.0 12,621 18,000 
30 South Korea (UM) 422.2 714.2 8,917 15,090 
111 South Africa (UM) 113.3 488.2 2,620 11,290 
35 Poland (UM) 176.3 365.3 4,561 9.450 
43 Chile (UM) 66.5 141.6 4,314 9,190 
58 Malaysia (M) 88.0 208.3 3,699 8,750 
65 Brazil (UM) 502.5 1,268.6 2,915 7,360 
74 Thailand (M) 114.7 391.7 1,874 6,400 
106 Iran (LM) 114.1 387.2 1,767 6,000 
72 Romania (LM) 38.7 130.7 1,728 5,830 
104 China (LM) 1,159.0 5,111.2 911.0 4,020 
85 Philippines (LM) 71.4 301.1 912.0 3,840 
120 Egypt (LM) 98.5 229.4 1,511.0 3,520 
112 Indonesia (LI) 145.3 615.2 695.0 2,940 
127 India (LI) 477.3 2,930.0 462.0 2,840 
145 Zimbabwe (LI) 9.1 29.3 706.0 2,800 
121 Nicaragua (LI) 4.0 11.7 754.7 2,200 
109 Vietnam (LI) 32.7 164.5 411.0 2,070 
160 Tanzania (LI) 9.3 18.0 271.0 520 
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Figure 4.1 
Wealth Effect (GDP) on Rights Performance 
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 Table 10.1 
Correlation of Wealth and Measures of Development 
 
 Region 
Measure 
A
ll 
A
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A
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A
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W
es
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ro
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Human 
development index 
(HDI) 2001 
0.92 
** 
0.88 
** 
0.93 
** 
0.97 
** 
0.86 
** 
0.97 
** 
0.88 
** 
0.93 
** 
0.94 
** 
Gender-related 
development index 
(GDI) 2001 
0.93 
** 
0.87 
** 
0.92 
** 
0.98 
* 
0.89 
* 
0.97 
** 
0.90 
** 
0.92 
** 
0.83 
** 
Rule of Law 0.82 
** 
0.58 
** 
0.91 
** 
0.95 
** 
0.90 
** 
0.81 
** 
0.64 
** 
0.89 
** 
0.92 
** 
Government 
Effectiveness 
0.77 
** 
0.49 
** 
0.90 
** 
0.98 
** 
0.92 
** 
0.85 
** 
0.69 
** 
0.78 
** 
0.91 
** 
Control of 
Corruption 
0.76 
** 
0.55 
** 
0.88 
** 
0.96 
** 
0.81 
** 
0.83 
** 
0.67 
** 
0.77 
** 
0.86 
** 
Voice and 
Accountability 
0.62 
** 
0.29 0.50
* 
0.94 
** 
0.75 
* 
0.73 
** 
0.34 0.18 0.85 
** 
PTS 2002  
(AI & State) 
-0.40 
** 
-0.22 -0.42 -0.74 -0.71 
* 
-0.21 0.10 -0.25 -0.48 
* 
N 174 41 19 6 10 20 20 15 23 
Cell entries are Pearson’s R coefficients.  Dependent variable is natural log of GDP per capita 
*p < .05, **p < .01 
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Table 11.1 
Gross Domestic Product Per Capita Growth Rate 
 
Annual Growth Rate GDP per Capita (%) Country and Human Development Indicator 
Rank 1975-2001 1990-2001 
104 China (LM) 8.2 8.8 
109 Vietnam (LI) 4.9 6.0 
29 Taiwan (UM) 8.9 5.6 
30 South Korea (UM) 6.2 4.7 
43 Chile (UM) 4.1 4.7 
28 Singapore (HI) 5.1 4.4 
35 Poland (UM) .. 4.4 
127 India (LI) 3.2 4.0 
58 Malaysia (M) 4.1 3.9 
74 Thailand (M) 5.4 3.0 
120 Egypt (LM) 2.8 2.5 
112 Indonesia (LI) 4.3 2.3 
26 Hong Kong (HI) 4.5 2.1 
7 United States (HI) 2.0 2.1 
106 Iran (LM) -0.6 2.0 
17 France (HI) 1.7 1.5 
65 Brazil (UM) 0.8 1.4 
9 Japan (HI) 2.6 1.0 
85 Philippines (LM) 0.1 1.0 
160 Tanzania (LI) 0.3 0.4 
111 South Africa (UM) -0.7 0.2 
72 Romania (LM) -1.3 -0.1 
121 Nicaragua (LI) -4.0 -0.1 
145 Zimbabwe (LI) 0.2 -0.2 
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SOURCES AND EXPLANATIONS FOR TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Figure 1.1:  Mark Gibney, Political Science Terror Scale, available at  
http://www.unca.edu/politicalscience/faculty-staff/gibney_docs/pts.xls (last visited Oct. 30, 2004). 
 
Figure 2.1:  THE WORLD BANK GROUP, GOVERNANCE MATTERS III: GOVERNANCE 
INDICATORS FOR 1996-2002, available at 
 http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002 (last visited Oct. 30, 2004). 
 
Figure 3.1: UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2003, 
Human Development Indicators, available at 
 http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/pdf/hdr03_HDI.pdf (last visited Oct. 30,2004).  LI refers 
to lower income countries; LM to lower middle income; M to middle income; UM to upper 
middle income; HI to high income. 
 
Table 1.1:  Columns 1-2: UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
REPORT 2003, Human Development Indicators, available at  
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/pdf/hdr03_HDI.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).  HPI 
rank is determined on the basis of the HPI-1 values.  The HPI value is a composite score based 
on standard of living measurements including life expectancy (probability of death before age 
40, education level (adult illiteracy rate), access to water (population without sustainable access 
to water), and access to food (children under-weight for age).  The aggregation rule is specified 
in Technical Note 1 of the UNDP 2003 Report, available at 
 http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/pdf/hdr03_backmatter_2.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2004). 
Column 3-5: THE WORLD BANK GROUP, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 2003 
(World Development Indicators 2003 CD-ROM). 
 The final column is calculated on the basis of ranking data in columns 1 and PPP$1 data 
in column 3.  A positive final column figure indicates that the country performs better in income 
poverty than in human poverty, a negative the opposite. 
 
Table 2.1:  Column 1: UNICEF (THE UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN’S FUND), THE STATE 
OF THE WORLD'S CHILDREN 2003 (New York: Oxford University Press 2003), available at 
http://www.unicef.org/sowc03/tables/table1.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2004). 
        Column 2: UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, 
POPULATION  DIVISION, WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS: THE 2002 REVISION POPULATION 
DATABASE, available at http://esa.un.org/unpp/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2004). 
        Column 3: UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION FOR EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND CULTURE, 
UNESCO INSTITUTE FOR STATISTICS, AP – Gross and Net Enrollment Ratios, Primary Table, 
available at http://www.uis.unesco.org/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2004). 
        Taiwan data is based on statistics compiled by the Taiwan Statistics Bureau.  Taiwan 
Statistics Bureau, 2002 Social Indicators Contents, available at 
http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/dgbas03/bs2/92chy/catalog.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2004). 
 
Table 3.1:  Column 1: UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION FOR EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND 
CULTURE, UNESCO INSTITUTE FOR STATISTICS, RE – Public Expenditure on Education as % 
of GNI, GDP, and Government Expenditure Table, available at http://www.uis.unesco.org/ (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2004).  Hong Kong education figure from report to ICESCR Committee. 
Column 2: THE WORLD BANK GROUP, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 2003 
(World Development Indicators 2003 CD-ROM). 
Column 3: STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, SIPRI Data on 
Military Expenditure, database available at 
http://web.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_data_index.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).   
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Taiwan data is based on statistics compiled by the Taiwan Statistics Bureau.  Taiwan 
Statistics Bureau, 2002 Social Indicators Contents, available at 
http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/dgbas03/bs2/92chy/catalog.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2004). 
 
Table 4.1: The World Bank Group, World Development Indicators 2003 (World 
Development Indicators 2003 CD-ROM).   
For Taiwan data see Report on The Survey of Family Income and Expenditure in Taiwan 
Area, Republic of China, available at http://www129.tpg.gov.tw/mbas/doc4/91/book/Year09.doc 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2004).  Taiwan HDI rank is an estimate. 
 
Table 5.1: THE WORLD BANK GROUP, GOVERNANCE MATTERS III: GOVERNANCE 
INDICATORS FOR 1996-2002, available at  
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002 (last visited Oct. 30, 2004). 
 
Table 6.1:  THE WORLD BANK GROUP, GOVERNANCE MATTERS III: GOVERNANCE 
INDICATORS FOR 1996-2002, available at  
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002 (last visited Oct. 30, 2004). 
 
Table 7.1: Column 1-5: INTERPOL, INTERNATIONAL CRIME STATISTICS: COUNTRY 
REPORT, at http://www.interpol.int/Public/Statistics/ICS/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2004). 
Column 6: INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR PRISON STUDIES, SCHOOL OF LAW AT KING’S 
COLLEGE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON, WORLD PRISON BRIEF, at  
http://www.prisonstudies.org/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).  Some Taiwan, U.S. and Singapore 
data came from compilations by national statistic offices.  Taiwan HDI rank is an estimate. 
 
Table 8.1: Column 1: UNITED NATIONS, DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK 2000, Table 25 – 
Divorces and Crude Divorce Rates: 1996-2000, available at  
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/dyb/DYB2000/Table25.xls (last visited Oct. 30, 
2004). 
Column 2: WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Suicide Rates per 100,000 by country, year 
and gender (Table), at http://www.who.int/mental_health/prevention/suicide/suiciderates/en/ 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2004) 
 Column 3: UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, 
POPULATION  DIVISION, WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS: THE 2002 REVISION POPULATION 
DATABASE, available at http://esa.un.org/unpp/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).  Taiwan HDI rank is 
an estimate. 
 
Table 9.1:  THE WORLD BANK GROUP, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 2003 
(World Development Indicators 2003 CD-ROM.); aggregates calculated for the Human 
Development Report Office by the World Bank. 
 
Figure 4.1: Good Government Practice: Combination of World Bank Indicators for Rule 
of Law, Government Effectiveness, and Control of Corruption.  See infra, Table 6.1. 
Human Development Index: UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2003, Human Development Indicators, available at  
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/indicator/index.html (last visited October 30,2004).   
Voice and Accountability: THE WORLD BANK GROUP, GOVERNANCE MATTERS III: 
GOVERNANCE INDICATORS FOR 1996-2002 (2003) available at  
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002 (last visited Oct. 30, 2004). 
Physical Integrity: Mark Gibney, Political Science Terror Scale, available at  
http://www.unca.edu/politicalscience/faculty-staff/gibney_docs/pts.xls (last visited Oct. 30, 2004). 
 
Table 10.1:  Figure 4.1, broken down by region.  Table 10.1 illustrates the relationship 
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between per capita GDP and various measures of development, across all countries and within 
regions.  Across all countries the relationship is highly significant (p < .01), but the strength of 
the correlation varies.  The UNDP Human Development Index (HDI) is correlated strongly 
with per capita GDP (r = .92), but physical integrity (PTS) bears a relatively weak correlation (r 
= -.40).  If we square these coefficients to compute r-square (as in regression), we can say that 
per capita GDP explains 85% of the variance in HDI across countries, but only 16% of the 
variance in physical integrity.  The same calculation can be made for the other measures of 
development, which are ranked in declining order for all countries.  Analysis of these variables 
within regions indicates variation in the relationship between wealth and development, but the 
same pattern is still largely evident.  Where no relationship exists (e.g., Voice and 
Accountability in the Middle East) it is due to the lack of variance within the region. 
 
Table 11.1:  UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 
2003, Human Development Indicators, GDP per capita Annual Growth Rate (%) Table, 
available at http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/indicator/indic_113_1_1.html (last visited Oct. 30, 
2004).    
 
 
